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Abstract 
Data Integrity: 
An often-ignored aspect of safety systems 
? f9Ta ... 
Data is all-pervasive and is found in all aspects of modern computer systems, and 
yet many engineers seem reluctant to recognise the importance of data integrity. 
The conventional view of data, as simply an aspect of software, underestimates 
the role played by data errors in the behaviour of the system and their potential 
effect on the integrity of the overall system. In many cases hazard analysis is not 
applied to data in the same way that it is applied to other system components. 
Without data integrity requirements, data development and data provision may not 
attract the degree of rigour that would be required of other system components of 
a similar integrity. This omission also has implications for safety assessment 
where the data is often ignored or neglected. This position becomes self re- 
enforcing, as without integrity requirements the importance of data integrity 
remains hidden. 
This research provides a wide-ranging overview of the use (and abuse) of data 
within safety systems, and proposes a range of strategies and techniques to 
improve the safety of such systems. A literature review and a survey of industrial 
practice confirmed the conventional view of data, and showed that there is little 
consistency in the methods used for data development. To tackle these problems 
this work proposes a novel paradigm, in which data is considered as a separate 
and distinct system component. This approach not only ensures that data is given 
the importance that it deserves, but also simplifies the task of providing guidance 
that is specific to data. Having developed this conceptual framework for data, the 
work then goes on to develop lifecycle models to assist with data development, 
and to propose a range of techniques appropriate for the various lifecycle phases. 
An important aspect of the development of any safety-related system is the 
production of a safety argument, and this research looks in some detail at the 
treatment of data, and data development, within this justification. The industrial 
survey reveals that in data-intensive systems data is often developed quite 
separately from other elements of the system. It also reveals that data is often 
produced by an extended data supply chain that may involve a number of 
disparate organisations. These characteristics of data distinguish it from other 
system components and greatly complicate the achievement and demonstration of 
safety. This research proposes methods of modelling complex data supply chains 
and proposes techniques for tackling the difficult task of safety justification for 
such systems. 
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Definitions 
Data driven systems 
ý1 41' 
In this research, computer-based safety-related systems are considered as using 
data in the form of an extensive configuration dataset, as data exchanged across 
interfaces with other systems, or as a schedule that describes some planned use 
of the system. Perhaps one summary of these three categories covers both data 
provided to, and data produced by, computer-based systems. The word 
"extensive" in the earlier sentence is included because a simple configuration 
dataset consisting of only a few data values could be verified adequately by 
inspection and extensive engineering processes would not be required. 
However, a typical configuration dataset for a complex control system may 
contain hundreds of thousands of data items, often with complex relationships, 
and ensuring the integrity of all this data is then far from trivial [4]. 
Safety system 
A safety-related system (or safety system) is required to implement the safety 
functions necessary to achieve a required risk reduction (or, more generally, to 
control risk such that it is tolerable). In addition the safety-related system is 
expected to achieve the necessary safety integrity to support these required 
safety functions. A failure of a safety-related system may give rise to a hazard 
that may lead directly to harm. 
Data 
Data is an abstraction. Common usage would regard numbers, characters and 
perhaps images as data. In more precise terms the association of context gives 
these numbers, characters and images meaning. Therefore we may infer that 
the intended use of the data provides the data with meaning. The use of data 
can range from representations of objects from the real world to abstract 
descriptions. 
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Data integrity 
f, F . ý. 
The term data integrity is perhaps overloaded. This term is used in a variety of 
circumstances and in each circumstance takes on a subtly different meaning. In 
this research data integrity is taken as a measure of data quality (5]. The 
term data integrity used within this research is derived from Engineering Safety 
Management (ESM) [6] and Sandhu [7] (who cites Courtney and Ware [8]). 
From the ESM definition for Safety Integrity (see below), ESM states that it 
follows for software that: 
"The software safety requirements will specffy the behaviour of the software 
and its safety Integrity,, which is a measure of the confidence that the 
software will behave safely. " 
Using the above definitions this research proposes that once data is recognised 
as a separate systems component, these definitions may be adapted for the data 
component so that the data safety requirements will specify the properties of 
the data and its safety integrity, which is a measure of the conFidence that the 
data will possess the desired properties [5]. 
Safety integrity 
ESM [6] defines safety integrity as: 
"The likelihood of a system, product or other change satisfactorily performing 
the required safety functions under all the stated conditions within a stated 
period of timew [6]. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 The use of data by safety systems 
anýý 
Many systems adopt a data driven approach (see definitions) specifically 
because of the apparent ease of modification of the data component. A data- 
driven approach provides considerable flexibility as a generic system may be 
used in a number of different applications. This flexibility also allows the system 
to be easily adapted in response to changes in the configuration of the system or 
its environment. In this way data-driven systems offer the opportunity to 
modify the data component and hence influence the behaviour of the system 
without changing the hardware and software components. However, this ease 
of modification is commonly based upon assumptions concerning the design, 
structure and modularity of data. 
The system developer might assume that the safety of the system is 
independent of the data and that in some way the verification of the software 
has validated the system for any data, and therefore changes to data are 
independent of the safety of the system and hence require only limited re- 
verification. These assumptions arise, in part, from the treatment of data as 
simply part of the software component. In addition there is a corresponding 
belief that data inherits the properties of good software design. In high integrity 
applications the apparent advantage to be gained through ease of modification 
of data is illusory, since the effort involved in re-validating the system following 
modifications to the data is often much greater than would be required for 
simple software changes. Unfortunately, unless the system has been specifically 
designed with the objective of simple re-validation in mind, the assumption that 
changes to data are independent of the safety of the system is almost certainly 
unjustified. 
1.2 Proposition: Data as a separate systems component 
This research proposes, a data paradigm, that data be treated as a separate 
system component. The research demonstrates that when data is treated as a 
separate systems component, this allows the formal apportionment of system 
safety requirements to data. A consequence of this allocation of safety 
requirements demands that data is treated with the same rigour as the 
hardware and software components of the system. 
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1.3.1 Aims 
This research was based upon the author's experience and the perception that 
data was not being treated with the 'appropriate' rigour. It is the author's 
experience that the potential influence of data errors on the behaviour of the 
systems that consume this data is often understated if not completely 
overlooked. 
The aim of this research is toraise the profile' of data; to initiate, and 
contribute to, the debate as to the treatment of data in safety systems. The 
author has contributed to this debate through publication of a number of papers 
and presentation to professional forums. It is also intended to provide those 
safety professionals who assess and analyse safety systems with guidance. 
1.3.2 Objectives 
The objectives of this research were: 
1) To develop a practical and theoretical basis for the treatment of the data 
component to show: 
a) By synthesis, that one or more data errors may give rise to a hazard 
that subsequently leads to an accident; 
b) That one or more data errors has contributed to at least one real life 
accident; and 
c) That the author's perceived view that data is indeed poorly addressed 
in standards, literature and industrial practice is valid. 
To propose guidance for the management of the data component of 
safety systems; 
This guidance will: 
a) Describe and classify data used by safety systems; 
This will include the development of a data taxonomy and 
subsequently lead to a statement of the requirements for the 
definition of data used by safety systems. 
b) Propose a method to derive data integrity requirements; 
c) Propose a model to express the use (and re-use) of data within a 
systems context; 
d) Propose a generic data and application data lifecycle model; 
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e) Describe the process of data provision; 
ýý. _- 
The process of data provision will include the identification of the 
requirements of a generic data supply chain. This research will also 
propose a method for the design and assessment of the data supply 
chain. 
To disseminate the research through published papers and professional 
forums. 
This dissemination could contribute to any revision of a standard, such as 
IEC 61508 [1]. A revision of a relevant standard would require practicing 
engineers to address the data component when reasoning about safety 
systems. 
1.4 The intended audience for this research 
The intended audience for this research are: 
i) Developers and Practitioners responsible for reasoning about safety 
systems; 
Approval and acceptance bodies - so that they may appreciate the risks 
associated with data (and data errors) and therefore ensure that data is 
treated appropriately in submissions for their approval (or acceptance); 
iii) Accident investigators - so that they consider data as a separate systems 
component, and in their search for causal mechanisms may attribute and 
subsequently record data as a causal factor in accidents; and 
iv) Standards setters including those who contribute to good practice guides. 
1.5 Structure of this document 
The basis for this research is established in section 2. This basis is supported by 
the description of the Cali Air Accident in section 2 and by a literature search 
and a survey of industrial practice that are presented in section 3. 
Section 4 then considers the definition of data used by safety systems and 
proposes a generic classification of data used by safety systems. 
Section 5 presents a method for deriving data integrity requirements. 
Where data is shared amongst a hierarchy of systems the influence and 
propagation of data errors is described through the use of a layered model. 
Section 6 describes the use and re-use of data in large-scale systems employing 
the layered model. 
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The required data should be validated before use. The Data validation policy 
may have a significant influence on the structure and complexity of the overall 
system safety case. Two data validation policies are described in section 7. 
The treatment of data as a separate systems component requires that data be 
treated with the same rigour as the hardware and software components of the 
system. Therefore data development should be the subject of a lifecycle model. 
The issues associated with a data lifecycle model are presented in section 8. 
The research has also considered the issues associated with data provision. This 
includes the development of a generic description of a data supply chain, and a 
graphical representation and a design method for such a data supply chain. The 
design and assessment of a data supply chain described in section 9. 
The discussion is presented in section 10. 
Section 11 describes the innovation, review and dissemination of this research. 
The conclusions and recommendations are developed in sections 12 and 13. 
Appendix A contains a brief description of the Engineering Doctorate Portfolio, 
together with a suggested order of reading. 
Appendix B contains a more detailed description of the layered model. 
Appendix C contains a more detailed description of the design and assessment 
of a data supply chain. 
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2 The basis for this research 
2.1 Data error as a causal factor in an accident 
This research is based upon the author's perception that there is a problem with 
the treatment of data used by safety systems. This perception is based upon 
the changing nature of these safety systems, in particular the increased reuse of 
components and in some cases complete applications. Although the safety 
community has debated the use of Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) 
components [9 to 12], this debate has not extended to the use of data by safety 
systems. 
The use of highly configurable systems, whether they reuse components or not, 
requires that these systems are provided with data that describes the real world. 
In some cases these systems also use data that describes the use of the system 
either in the form of constraints or parameters or as descriptions of the service 
to be provided. Where such a system relies upon the correctness of the data, 
data errors may subsequently give rise to a hazard that may subsequently lead 
to an accident. 
To support the assertion this section describes a possible mechanism where data 
error may lead to an accident. The brief case study of Flight AA 965 provides a 
graphic illustration of the truth behind the assertion that data (and data error) 
can and does contribute to accidents and resultant deaths. 
Additional Support is also provided to show that Flight AA 965 is not an isolated 
incident and therefore the use of data and the consequence of data error are an 
often ignored aspect of safety systems. 
2.2 A theoretical air accident 
It is common for the general public to travel by air. Airlines provide frequent 
flights to many destinations at low cost. This accessibility masks the nature of 
air travel. A flight is largely described by data derived, in part, from the physical 
mapping of the terrain and the design and implementation of the description of 
the airspace. Using this data description, a single aircraft flight will be described 
by the flight plan. The flight plan will comprise a number of data constructs 
such as the departure airport, in-flight navigation waypoints and destination 
airport in addition to aircraft type and capabilities. In modern aircraft the flight 
plan is entered into the Flight Management System (FMS) and used to 
automatically direct the aircraft. 
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If such a flight plan contained data errors it would be conceivable that the data 
error may give rise to a hazard. In this example the aircraft may fly towards the 
terrain and if no other mitigating actions took place subsequently crash into the 
terrain. 
2.3 Flight AA 965 - Call Columbia - December 1995 
2.3.1 An otherwise uneventful flight 
On the evening of December 20,1995, American Airlines Flight AA 965 from 
Miami, Florida, U. S. A., was approaching Aragon Airport, in Cali, Colombia. This 
was a scheduled flight, the final stages of which were completed at night. 
Although delayed while on the ground at Miami, the early part of the flight had 
been uneventful. The Captain had flown 13 times into Cali; the First Officer was 
on his first flight into Cali [13]. 
The approach to Cali is along a deep valley between two mountain ranges. Had 
the flight been completed during daylight hours the crew would have been able 
to appreciate the proximity of the high mountains on either side of the 
approach. Cali's Aragon Airport is approximately 3000 feet above sea level, and 
the mountain ranges on the east of the approach range from 5000 to 6000 feet, 
but to the east the terrain rises rapidly to almost 13,000 feet [14]. 
There are two types of instrument approaches into Cali's only north-south 
runway. One is a VOR-DME approach that is utilised when flights are landing 
towards the south on Runway 19 (1119). The other, an ILS precision approach 
for flights landing north on Runway 01 (R01). It was this north approach and 
landing that Flight AA 965 planned when it left Miami. This meant that their 
flight path would have taken them over the airport at a safe altitude, then 
southbound toward the Cali VOR for a few miles before reversing course and 
flying inbound on the ILS course for a landing on Runway 01 [14]. 
Upon contacting Cali Control (ATC) approximately 65 miles north of Cali, Flight 
AA 965 was cleared to descend to and maintain 15,000 feet and report passing 
Tulua. Tulua is a VOR navigation fix located 34 miles north of the airport, and is 
the IAF (initial approach fix) or beginning point for the VOR-DME approach to 
Runway 19. ATC offered Flight AA 965 the opportunity for a direct approach to 
Runway 19. This was a change to the flight plan previously programmed in the 
FMS. This was also the initiating event for the accident sequence that was to 
follow. 
Of the 155 passengers, 2 flight crew, and 6 cabin crew on board, only 4 
passengers survived the accident. 
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2.3.2 The accident sequence of Flight AA 965 
Having accepted the opportunity for a direct approach to Runway 19, the flight 
crew had also accepted a high workload to prepare for landing. Part of this 
workload was to reprogram the FIVIS for the direct approach to Runway 19. 
To program the direct approach the flight crew selected 'R' (for ROZO on the 
navigation chart) as the entry into the FMS. As a result of this entry the FMS 
instructed the plane to turn left towards ROMEO NDB. The fight crew detected 
the turn and started to correct after 901. A Ground Proximity Warning System 
(GPWS) alarm was triggered. However, despite a quick response from the flight 
crew the aircraft crashed into the terrain [16]. 
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Figure 1: A segment of the navigation chart for Flight AA 965 approach to Cali 
Source: Flight Safety Digest [15]. 
This accident sequence has many contributory and causal factors, but foremost 
amongst these is the data duplicate for identification of the ROZO and ROMEO 
NDBs. 
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2.3.3 Navigational data duplicates in the vicinity of Cali 
Pýml., -ý 
On air navigation charts each NDB is identified by name and letter. In addition 
via a radio frequency transmission of the Morse code for identifying letter of the 
NDB is used. In this case ROZO and ROMEO shared the same first letter'R'and 
radio frequency of 274 Khz. Furthermore the man machine interface of the FMS 
presented the flight crew with 12 other'R' options, none of which were 
ROZO [16]. 
ROZO and ROMEO NDBs are about 150 nautical miles apart from each other. 
The navigation data used by Flight AA 965 contained a number of errors; firstly 
that ROZO NDB was not presented on the FIVIS display- an error of omission; 
and secondly that many of the NDBs used Was their first letter -a systematic 
error and an error of commission as the flight crew was presented with more 
than one'R. The multiple use of'R' makes the cognitive task of selecting the 
'right' NDB more difficult than necessary. 
2.4 Flight AA 965 is not an Isolated incident 
Many accident sequences occur a number of times, only rarely do they result in 
an accident. This was the case for the Flight AA 965 accident. In a presentation 
Captain Bertrand de Courville [16] describes a series of other incidents, one of 
which is based upon a data error in a similar approach sequence after the 
Flight AA 965 Cali accident. 
Data quality, and hence data integrity, remains an issue within the aeronautical 
navigation domain. Data quality is an issue in other domains as well. 
2.5 An Initial search for guidance 
An initial review of the available literature and a limited selection of standards 
confirmed the initial view that data is indeed poorly addressed. Theoretical 
analysis shows that data can give rise to hazards that may subsequently lead 
directly to accidents. Flight AA 965 confirms that data (and data error) has been 
a significant causal factor in at least one real life accident and not just in theory. 
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3 The treatment of data in the existing literature and a survey of 
industrial practice 
3.1 The research environment 
The author has conducted this research In parallel with the execution of the full 
time duties and responsibilities of a Chartered Engineer employed in a number 
of senior engineering roles. This industrial setting has provided the author with 
access to other practising engineers. 
3.2 The treatment of data in the existing literature 
A literature search using the Inspec and Compendex search engines initially only 
revealed a single paper In this area, this being by Welbome and Bester [17]. 
Welborne and Bester acknowledge the limited literature in this area and are 
primarily concerned with the configuration, setting to work, and maintenance of 
plant and equipment within a nuclear plant. Their focus is on implementation 
rather than design. Many combinations of searches failed to identify other 
significant Items of literature. In part, this Is due to the variety of terms used to 
reference data and issues associated with data integrity. Some time later a 
casual remark In a structured interview led to the identification of DO 200A [18]. 
DO 200A addresses the supply of aeronautical navigation data. DO 200A 
contains much useful guidance particularly on the identification of scalar data 
properties and a description of an aeronautical data supply chain. 
The literature (and standards such as IEC 61508-3 [19]) contains a considerable 
array of guidance for the design and development of the software component. 
This guidance often takes the form of recommended techniques and measures to 
be used In each stage of the software development lifecycle. In contrast, 
although data is mentioned several times, IEC 61508 does not recognise the role 
played by data in many safety-related systems, being concerned only with the 
data required by algorithms. This restricted view of data may also be 
underestimating the influence of data errors on the behavior of the system. 
An example of this treatment Is illustrated by the IEC 61508-3 statement that 
'%.. the design method chosen shall possess features that facilitate ... the 
expression of... data structures and their properties% While this statement is 
welcomed it Is not consistent with the treatment of the hardware and software 
components by the standard. In addition the standard says nothing of the 
methods that should be used to generate or verify data, and it does not Identify 
specific data requirements. This can, in part, be attributed to the systems 
technologies available at the time IEC 61508 was drafted. 
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The treatment of data in the standards (and literature) leads directly to the 
conventional view of data as merely an aspect of software. This conventional 
view of data has a significant influence on the way data is treated, and may lead 
directly to poor data integrity. 
3.3 A survey of industrial practice 
As part of this research a number of structured interviews and reviews were 
undertaken, primarily in the rail and to a lesser extent the aviation domains, to 
establish the state of practice. The interviews have identified that data may be 
drawn from a single source, a situation that would cause significant discussion if 
the hardware or software components of the system were similarly exposed to 
such a potential for common cause errors. Based upon the literature review [5], 
and now supported by this record of industrial practice [20], we can have little 
confidence that data used by safety-related systems will possess the required 
integrity. 
Practising engineers often required persuasion to encourage them to participate 
in the survey. On a number of occasions participation was agreed only on the 
basis of anonymity. Although many more individuals were contacted, once the 
area of interest was explained many of prospective candidates declined to 
participate. This was partly due to recognition of the issues concerned and a 
reluctance to expose these issues within their own work environments or 
projects. 
The results of the survey are also supported in a number of incident and 
accident reports from a range of industrial sectors. In these reports the author 
notes that the integrity of the hardware and software components of the system 
appeared to be adequate. In some cases a lack of data integrity has been a 
significant factor that has led to harm (people have been killed [13,21 and 22] 
and many others remain at risk [23 to 25]). 
3.4 A conventional view of data used by safety systems 
A conventional view of data tends to pay little attention to the design, 
production or verification of data. The survey of industrial practice (20] has 
demonstrated that many engineers concentrate on the processing of data, 
focusing upon the management of error within the algorithms and the software 
that implements them. 
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In this conventional view of data, the system integrity requirements are 
apportioned to the software component, and the system developer may not 
recognise the influence of data errors on the integrity of the overall system. 
Without separate data integrity requirements it is difficult to see how a system 
developer can reasonably demonstrate that their data-driven system will provide 
confidence that the target failure rates can be achieved. 
It is unsurprising that when reporting upon the factors leading to an accident 
many investig*ation authorities take the conventional view of data [13]. These 
reports may simply attribute a data causal factor to software. It therefore 
becomes problematic to find direct references to data in these accident reports 
without significant re-examination of each accident. 
Perhaps the most striking result to come from the structured interviews was the 
total lack of any uniform approach to the development or maintenance of data. 
In many cases engineers had not considered data in any detail and had no 
specific strategy for dealing with the particular problems that it presents. 
Treating data simply as an aspect of software leads directly to a self reinforcing 
argument so that: 
i) Data is often not subjected to any systematic hazard or risk analysis. 
ii) Data is often not given any specific safety requirements. 
iii) Data is often not assigned any specific integrity requirements. 
iv) Data is often poorly structured, making errors more likely and harder to 
detect. 
V) Data is often not subjected to any form of separate verification. 
The key finding from the literature review and industrial practice survey 
suggests that data within data-driven systems is often not being developed in 
the same way as application software. It also suggests that in many cases the 
data is not being developed and managed in a way that would satisfy the 
requirements outlined in IEC 61508, or other standards, for the development of 
software. 
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4 Defining data for use by safety systerns 
4.1 The use of an extended data dictionary to support data definition 
It is good practice for large systems to use a data dictionary to manage the 
definition of the data component, however as these data definitions become 
more extensive, the management of complex dependencies within these data 
dictionaries becomes more difficult to control. This research recognises that 
although data may be defined within the development arena, this data will be 
provided by people and processes in the real world. 
4.2 The properties of data 
An important factor in determining the integrity of a system is the quality of the 
data that it uses. One of the few standards to consider this topic is 
DO 200A [18], which is concerned with aeronautical data. According to 
DO 200A data quality consists of accuracy, resolution, assurance level, 
traceability, timeliness, completeness and format. It is notable that data 
described within DO 200A are predominantly scalar quantities. Data may also 
represent binary quantities and references between single data items, collections 
of data items or between internal and external references in data models. 
It is common when developing large information systems to create a data 
dictionary, particularly where the proposed system uses one or more data 
models. The data dictionary usually contains a description of the data model, its 
structure and the data elements and their attributes. The data element 
description, its 'type definition' and indeed each data instance maybe owned by 
separate parties. The extensive use of data from both within, and externally to, 
the development arena requires additional controls for the definition of data and 
aspects of data such as ownership, usage, update and validation. To address 
these additional requirements it is proposed by this research that these data- 
driven (and data-intensive) systems require an extended data dictionary to 
include: 
1) The origin of each data element, relationship and attributes (this may 
also provide a description of the requirements for the data supply chain); 
ii) The owner of each data element, relationship and attribute 
(see section 9.10); 
iii) A register of interest of all those systems which will use (consume) each 
data element, relationship and attribute together with the integrity 
requirement of each consuming system; 
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iv) The system responsible for the updating of each data element, 
relationship and attribute; 
V) A set of rules for the validation of each data element, relationship and 
attribute; and, 
vi) A set of default values to be used in the event of failure to acquire data 
of the appropriate integrity for each data element, relationship or 
attribute for each system which will consume the data. 
The general requirements of a data dictionary must also be maintained. The 
data dictionary should be complete and unambiguous. A key objective of the 
data dictionary is to capture information only once; in such a way that it is 
available for all. The use of the data dictionary provides a single point in which 
the data requirements for all the systems may be managed. The data dictionary 
should also contain an explicit statement of interrelations and data dependencies 
within the overall system. 
4.3 A classification of data used in safety systems 
4.3.1 The classification proposed by Welborne and Bester 
Welborne and Bester [17] identify the following classes of data: 
i) Calibration data 
Calibration data, used to define, for example, the characteristics of each 
input signal such as electrical range, signal range, plant units, alarm or 
trip levels. 
li) Configuration data 
Configuration data, used to define, for example, such items as display 
screen formats, termination data, plant locations, communications 
protocols, memory maps, where (the) calibration data are (located). 
iii) Functionality data 
Functionality data, used to define, for example, what logic operations are 
performed, what timing considerations apply, which signals are operated 
for a function, control states to be taken up at failure. 
Welborne and Bester used their classification on the installation and 
commissioning of a large UK Nuclear plant. As such the classification reflects 
the requirement to combine existing plant and equipment into a process control 
system. The separation of Calibration Data reflects the need to address time 
based properties, such as drift or changes in physical effects due to ageing. 
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However the author feels that this Calibration Data is more suited as a subset of 
Configuration data. Indeed the locations of these data items are already 
included within the Calibration Data class. 
The Welborne and Bester Functionality class contains elements that are more 
suited to a treatment as limited variability software, and as such are already 
addressed in standards associated with the process industry (IEC 61511 [26]). 
Welborne and Bester are concerned with a system that has a 'single' use. It 
would be undesirable to implement nuclear process systems as 'agile' 
reconfigurable systems. As such Welborne and Bester describe a largely fixed 
system. A more generic approach needs to address a data class that contains a 
description of some future use of the system as a schedule or timetable. In 
addition a generic system should address the requirements of data derived not 
only from local systems but also data derived from external information 
systems. 
4.3.2 The classification proposed in this research 
A classification of data is required to provide a means by which the role of data 
may be described and by which potential data errors may be analysed. A useful 
tool in the classification of data is the 'data box model'. This facilitates the 
expression of the data integrity requirements as data passes across the 
boundary of the system or system component. The author believes that the box 
model presented in Figure 2 is applicable to a wide range of systems. 
Schedule 
Status Data Control System Operational Data 
Configuration Data 
Figure 2: Data in the context of a control system 
The box model identifies the system as a single box. Data that crosses the 
system boundary (in either direction) may contain errors and subsequently give 
rise to hazards. This data classification consists of four categories of data 
(configuration data, operational data, status data and schedule data). 
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These categories provide the basis of an analysis to establish the data integrity 
requirements by consideration of the types of failure that each of these forms of 
data might exhibit. These four data categories are described below: 
i) Configuration data 
Configuration data is a description of the infrastructure and its 
capabilities and constraints. In the rail industry, the infrastructure 
includes, in general, both fixed assets and mobile equipment such as 
vehicles. This description is most conveniently regarded as "staticff data 
in that it represents the entities in the real world, which change only in 
response to the action of maintenance or modification of these entities. 
Static configuration data is also used to configure the hardware and 
software components and may also provide the characterisation of these 
standardised components including parameterisation that describes how 
these components are to operate. For example, configuration data may 
be required to describe the physical connections between hardware 
components, and configuration data may also be required to describe the 
logical software connections, devices and services. 
ii) Status Data 
Status Data is provided through interfaces to external reporting systems 
and direct status information from connections to local sensors and other 
inputs. 
iii) Operational Data 
Operational Data represents the individual operational conditions perhaps 
communicated to the control system via manual input. In the rail 
industry, the operator receives these operational conditions through 
human communication interfaces such as telephone and fax. The set of 
operational conditions represents persistent restrictions on the use of the 
infrastructure. These operational conditions may arise through adverse 
weather conditions, equipment failures or reports of accidents. 
iv) A Command Schedule 
A Command Schedule is used to describe the required use of the 
infrastructure. For example a railway control system would use a train 
schedule to describe the planned movements of multiple trains across the 
rail infrastructure and an ATC system a set of Flight Plans. 
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4.3.3 Using a data classification within a systems context 
It is common for an application to cooperate with other applications and 
subsystems within an overall system. In such a systems context the role of an 
individual application, data structure or data element may be obscured. To aid 
the visualisation of the role section 6 describes a layered model. 
Where data is shared by several systems it becomes important to classify data 
and to separate out other elements such as limited variability software. Such 
limited variability software often acts asglue' interposed between elements 
within the system. This'glue'seeks to adapt the imperfections and 
shortcomings of the juxtaposition of differing (often pre-existing) applications 
within this system. Welborne and Bester include these'glue' software elements 
within their definition of data. 
This research recognises these software elements as software and requires that 
they be treated as simply an aspect of the software component. In addition this 
research recognises that some data driven systems consume data in the form of 
a schedule. It also recognises that this schedule data describes some future use 
of the system and as such manipulation of the elements within this schedule 
data may affect the safety of the overall system. Manipulating schedule data 
may influence the probability (or likelihood) of an event through either an 
increase or decrease in the time separation of schedule events. Where such 
events represent the movement of trains or airplanes these time separations 
may be equated to distances and hence possible accidents. 
This research asserts that the classification of data presented in section 4.3.2 
can be applied to a range of applications (and systems) contexts. 
4.4 An assurance model for data used In safety systems 
When considering data definition, provision should be made to facilitate a 
demonstration that the data integrity requirements have been, or indeed could 
be met. Therefore alongside the data definition should be a description of an 
assurance model. 
The assurance model described below is based upon the concepts and 
terminology used in the UK CAA document Air Traffic Services Safety 
Requirements (CAP 670) section SWO1 [27]. The relevant software concepts 
from CAP 670 SWO1 have been adapted for data to give: 
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The concept of Assurance Evidence Level (AEL) to express the level of 
confidence that a data component will possess the integrity according to 
its specification on the basis of the strength and depth of the available 
evidence; 
The five fundamental safety objectives which a safety-related system 
must fulfil, namely requirements validity, requirements satisfaction, 
traceability, configuration consistency and non-interference with safety 
functions by non-safety functions; 
iii) The concept of direct and backfng evidence; and 
iv) The requirement to define the integrity of a data component in terms of a 
defined set of attributes. 
The assurance model should be developed for all aspects of data used by safety 
systems including each of the phases of the data supply-chain (discussed in 
section 9). The Assurance Evidence Level as defined in SWO1 is not a measure 
of reliability, but a measure of confidence that a component satisfies its 
requirements. A safety-related system will have specific safety reliability 
requirements, which may be expressed in the form of numeric failure rate 
targets, or as a Safety Integrity Level (SIL). 
4.5 Data definition in the data supply chain 
It is proposed by this research that requirements specifications are required not 
only for the data but also for each element of the data chain, and the tools that 
are used to manipulate or verify data representations. These data requirement 
specifications form the data definition. The process of data definition should be 
used to identify any common data elements, Including their respective quality 
and integrity requirements. See section 9 for a description of a data supply 
chain. 
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5 Deriving data integrity requirements 
5.1 The use of Integrity requirements as a measure of criticality 
Integrity requirements are often used as a measure of the criticality of a system. 
In addition IEC 61508 [1] uses a classification of integrity requirements as a 
basis for the recommendation of techniques and measures to be used during the 
development of the system. This section presents a method for deriving data 
integrity requirements. 
5.2 Integrity requirements based upon numerical targets for failure rates 
Integrity requirements are commonly expressed as numerical targets for failure 
rates for each function of the system or sub-system. To attain the required 
integrity level the system should not only be developed using the techniques and 
measures recommended by standards such as IEC 61508, but this integrity level 
should also be demonstrated by the system whilst in service. This 
demonstration will be through the achievement of the appropriate target failure 
rates while in service, when supported by appropriate maintenance procedures. 
In basing the integrity requirements upon minimum failure rate targets, 
standards such as IEC 61508, take no account of the scale or size of the system. 
The larger the system to be developed, the greater the amount of effort required 
to achieve the minimum failure rate. Therefore the development of larger 
systems requires improvements in both process and design (architecture) to 
achieve these minimum failure rates. 
5.3 Adapting Functional Failure Analysis for use with data 
To establish the integrity requirements for a given system it is important to 
identify the functional behaviour of the system and the mechanisms by which 
the identified functionality may fail. As each failure may give rise to a hazard, 
the potential harm should be established for each system hazard. An example 
of a technique that might be used to determine integrity requirements is 
Functional Failure Analysis (FFA). 
The basic FFA process (proposed by this research, as it applies to data errors) is 
to: 
Identify the functions; 
For each identified function, suggest failure modes (based upon data 
errors), using the guidewords (see section 5.4); 
For each failure mode, consider the effects of the failure on the system 
(this may require the development of a number of operational scenarios); 
and 
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iv) Identify and record any actions necessary to improve the design. 
5.4 A proposed set of guidewords to be used with Functional Failure 
Analysis 
This research has developed sets of guidewords, adapted from SHARD [2], and 
work by Harrison and Pierce [28] to be used as prompts in the consideration of 
possible failure modes (based upon data errors). 
Table 1: Guidewords used in the consideration of possible data errors 
Data ClasaMcation aukhrdwords 
Configuration data Omission, Spurious data (commission), Positioning, Topological, 
Addressing, Type, Labelling, Value [28] 
Status data Mode, Sequential, Combinational, Propagation, Timing, Volume 
(connected equipment) 
Status data Existence, Reference, Availability, Inconsistent, Timely 
(external systems) 
Operational data Existence, Reference errors, Type errors, Inconsistent, Timely, 
Mode error, Sequential errors, Combinational errors, Propagation 
errors 
Schedule data Existence, Reference, Availability, Inconsistent, Timing, I 
Propagation 
5.5 Apportionment of the system safety requirements to data 
Integrity requirements may be expressed in the form of an allowable failure rate 
and this can be considered as a failure budget for the system. The definition of 
the system architecture will have played a large part in the determination of the 
integrity requirements and is used to apportion the failure budget between 
random and systematic failures. The hardware component will be apportioned 
the random failure rate budget. 
While integrity requirements are more than just a set of target failure rates, 
these targets are of importance. In an arrangement consisting of several 
component parts in series (in other words, all of which are necessary for the 
correct functioning of the system), the overall number of system failures will be 
equal to the sum of the system failures produced by each component. 
Therefore, if a system consists of hardware, software and data elements, the 
overall target failure rate may be apportioned to provide separate failure rates 
for each element. This implies that in a data-intensive system of a particular 
SIL, one aspect of the data integrity requirements should be that data errors 
should not produce system failures at a rate greater than that allocated to the 
data component. It also implies that the data will require a target failure rate 
that is lower than the figure given for the corresponding SIL. 
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6 The use (and re-use) of data in large-scale systems 
6.1 A requirement for a model to assist in the visualisation of large-scale 
systems 
Large-scale systems tend to be complex. A major constraint in the visualisation 
of such systems is the variability of often hybrid architectures. This variability 
leads to a requirement for standardisation, not least in the visualisation of such 
systems. This research proposes the use of the layered systems model 
presented in section 6.2. A further refinement is the adaptation of this layered 
model to show the use (and re-use) of data in such large-scale systems. 
6.2 A layered model for large-scale systems 
6.2.1 A railway as an example of a large-scale system 
An operational railway is a complex system. Even the most brief of 
examinations of Figure 3 reveals the interrelated nature of a range of 
engineering disciplines, that all need to come together to form the operational 
system. These engineering disciplines are track, Civil Engineering Works, 
electrification (traction power) and plant, rolling stock and signalling, to name 
those that are most readily identified in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: An operational railway as a large-scale system 
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When considered on a national scale, an operational railway is also a large-scale 
system. In order to reason about such large-scale systems we need to create a 
framework (or model) to express the role of the constituents of the system. 
Perhaps, by way of introduction, the best way to explain such a framework is to 
start with an explanation of the components of a railway. 
A railway, in its simplest form, is used to transport people and goods from one 
geographic location to another. A pictorial representation of the railway is 
shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: A pictorial representation of an operational railway 
The railway may be classified as a guided rail system, where the train (1) passes 
over the rails as directed by the signals controlled by the signalling control 
centre (2). The signalling control centre, amongst other functions, executes 
route setting and the 'regulation' of trains across the rail network. The signalling 
control function manages a control area and is managed by regional (or zone) 
organisations (3). The regional organisations execute the strategy and policy 
set out by the enterprise (4). In a highly regulated environment governmental 
bodies such as the Office of the Rail Regulator (ORR) (5) may determine some of 
these policies and strategies. 
Each of these 'layers' exchange information either as data or as control actions. 
To further describe these control actions consider the signalling control function 
within the signalling control centre. 
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6.2.2 The systems hierarchy within the signalling function 
The systems hierarchy within the signalling function is depicted in Figure 5. 
Within this systems hierarchy status information from the plant (1) is passed via 
the plant interface to the 'interlocking' (2). The interlocking sets points and 
signals to enable the safe passage of trains and is a rule based protection device 
that may contain features, usually implemented as tokens, to disable parts of 
the interlocking and hence restrict trains from access to parts of the rail 
network. 
These tokens may take the form of collars and may be placed by the signalman 
or 'route bars' entered through the technician's terminal (for more persistent 
tokens). 
Status information is then passed to the signalmen's panel or workstation (3). 
The signalman (4) may use reminder devices such as notes as an additional 
reminder of operational restrictions. 
Control Centre 
70perational 
Rules rT 
Workstation / Panel T*11 A 
Collar qw 
Interloc 
-r2 
Plant II Signals 
I 
Train 
1 
Machines 
Figure 5: The signalling function within a railway control centre 
Infrastructure 
Monitoring 
The signalman regulates trains through a combination of judgement, 
competence, experience and the use of the workstation (or panel) to issue a 
command to the interlocking. The interlocking checks its rules before accepting 
the command and issuing one or more commands via the plant interface to the 
plant, in this example commanding a points machine (switch) to move. 
The layered model presented on the left of Figure 5 presents the signalling 
function in a number of layers [29). A more detailed explanation of the role and 
function of these layers is contained within Appendix B 
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The author considers that this layered model is generic and that may 
consequently be applied to other functions and systems. The author concurs 
with Richard Allan [29] in considering that the extent of any safety function 
should be limited to the first four layers (plant, plant interface, reflex and 
supervisory). If this limit is used then the signalman can optimise the delivery 
of the train service by using whole safety functions. In addition the use of whole 
safety functions may reduce the complexity of any safety argument concerning 
the signalling function to a reasonable minimum. 
6.3 A layered model to express the role of one or more systems within a 
hierarchy of systems 
The form of distributed systems varies tremendously; one can gain an insight 
Into the interaction between system elements by considering a typical 
distributed control system. For this purpose, section 6.2 has introduced the very 
specific example of a large-scale railway control system, though it should be 
noted that not all systems would follow this scheme. The model is described in 
some detail in Appendix B 
This abstraction into layers allows the development or replacement of the 
underlying layers based upon a respect for the services provided by each layer, 
and the preservation of the interfaces at each layer boundary. A system 
possessing low coupling and high cohesion will generally possess the desirable 
design properties of resilience and stability. Low coupling and high cohesion 
also minimises the effects that changes to one component have on other 
components of the system. The value of these properties has been considered 
self evident for both good software and good systems design, appearing in many 
texts. However anecdotal evidence suggests that the value of these design 
properties has not been recognised in the design of data used by data-intensive 
systems. Data, in common with hardware and software, is a system component 
and broad parallels can be drawn as to the desirable properties for good design 
of the data component of a system. 
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Figure 6: A layered model for a hierarchy of systems 
The model, in Figure 6, depicts a control system as a hierarchy based upon the 
role and nature of the functional layers within the system. 
A typical control system may require many human operators. Each operator will 
usually be responsible for one aspect of the system such as one or more control 
areas. An example is Air Traffic Management where an aircraft crosses many 
control sectors (areas) during its flight. The delivery of the planned services 
requires the provision of a seamless control of the infrastructure when handing 
over control from one control area to the next. These operators may also be 
supervised. In this context, Figure 6 could illustrate two operator positions, 
which may control the infrastructure within the same 'control centre' or in 
separate 'control centres'. The intention of Figure 6 is to illustrate both 
horizontal and vertical coupling within a realistic example system. 
This research identifies vertical coupling via the numbered triangles; horizontal 
coupling via the numbered star shapes. Both vertical and horizontal coupling 
may be applied to services provided at each layer and between peer components 
within the layered model. In the context of data driven systems this research 
proposes that vertical and horizontal coupling may be applied to data used and 
produced by applications or complete systems within the layered model. 
6.4 The use of the layered model to expose the use (and reuse) of data 
In the context of this research the layered model is used in conjunction with the 
data classification (see section 4.3.2). Each system, plant or equipment will 
contain varying amounts of each of the classes of data. Those components at 
the lower levels of the hierarchy are less likely to use the schedule data. The 
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components in the mid and higher parts of the hierarchy are more likely to use 
schedule data. 
Within this systems hierarchy data is exchanged across external interfaces, and 
across internal interfaces. In such a hierarchy data may be used within several 
layers. Each system component may use this common data in a different 
context and hence re-used data may be also attributed subtly different meaning 
for each usage. The layered model allows the visualisation of the extent of the 
influence of these data structures, data elements or data items. This 
visualisation may identify a requirement for validation at an interface to 
preserve the integrity of one or more safety functions. One aspect of the 
interpretation of these visualisations is the use of rules for the exchange of data 
between systems. 
6.5 Rules for data exchange between systems within the layered model 
The rules for data exchange between systems are derived from practices 
common to many safety-related standards. The requirements presented below 
are adapted and extend from Petersen's DISC report [30]. Data should only be 
shared amongst systems when the data integrity requirements of each 
consuming system are fully satisfied. 
The requirements are that: 
i) The data integrity requirements of all sub-systems or applications within 
the system are documented; 
Data may be passed from a higher integrity system to a lower integrity 
system (provided that the data from the higher integrity system exceeds 
the data integrity requirements of the lower integrity system for each of 
the data elements passed across the interface, including error rates and 
error modes); 
Data may be passed between systems of the same integrity requirements 
if and only if these data integrity requirements are compatible, including 
error rates and error modes; 
iv) Data may not be passed (without verification) from a lower integrity 
system to a higher integrity system unless data integrity requirements 
are compatible, as this low integrity data, by definition, may contain a 
data error rate greater than that required by the high integrity system; 
and 
V) The hardware and software components of these systems meet the 
integrity requirements for each system. 
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7 Validating data for use by safety systems 
7.1 Proposing a data validation policy 
Common sense dictates that data is validated before use. This section presents 
two validation policies and notes their influence upon the structure and 
complexity of the safety arguments associated with the data component. 
7.2 Data passed across the system interface 
The extent and nature of resources required to validate data are strongly 
influenced by the integrity of the source data as well as the integrity of the 
processes used to transport this data to the systems which will consume it. This 
is a multi-facetted problem; on one hand are small-scale systems whose data 
can be adequately managed through data entry and delivery of a validated 
dataset. At the other extreme are large-scale systems drawing data from a 
number of sources. This data is processed, transformed, consolidated, 
transported and finally delivered to one element of the overall system. An 
example of such a system is Air Traffic Management (ATM), where a number of 
control systems share common data such as aircraft type or'adaptation data' 
describing the airways. A second facet is the maturity of the application. New 
systems may require completely new datasets, whilst new implementations of 
existing systems may re-use existing data. 
Irrespective of the scale of the system, data may be passed across an interface 
at the system boundary. This data is likely to be transformed from the external 
representation into its internal representation. This research proposes that this 
data should be verified either through an automated (but not automatic) 
process. This automated process is likely to require supervision and where 
necessary manual intervention and is depicted in Figure 7. 
Transformation Verificati(m 
Supervisory I 
External Internal -, -- --- Reflex 
representation Representation 
Plant Interface 
Autornat Manual 
Plant 
External Systems Control System 
Figure 7: Data passed across an interface at the system boundary 
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!I This research notes that the point at which data validation takes place is likely to 
have a significant influence on the structure and complexity of the safety 
argument for the data component of the overall system. 
7.3 Data validation at point of data entry 
Data may be extracted from existing data sets or created at data entry. In this 
research the term 'data origination' is used to describe the origin of data. 
Tillotson [31] observes an approach where the responsibility for data integrity 
may rest at the data source with data entry. However this may be three, four or 
five systems away from where the data is used. 
7.4 Data validation as the responsibility of the consuming system 
An alternative policy is proposed by DO 200A [18] where the responsibility to 
ensure that the data integrity requirements have been met rests with the user of 
the data. 
7.5 Data validation policy and its influence on the system safety case 
The system safety case should consider all aspects of the system, its behaviour 
and the processes used in its creation, operation and maintenance. In a system 
where a conventional view of data is taken, the safety case will address the 
hardware and software components of the system. Where data is treated as a 
separate component, the safety case will also explicitly address the data 
component. The processes for the design and development of the data 
component will have many similarities with those processes used to design and 
develop the hardware and software components of the system. However this is 
where the similarities end. Elements of the data component may be subject to 
continual change, being updated or modified as a normal part of the operational 
system. The system safety case should address this aspect of the data 
component. 
A data validation policy, which only considers validation at data entry, extends 
the effective system boundary to include the processes, procedures and people 
that execute data entry. This extended system boundary significantly increases 
the complexity of the safety argument for the data component. This complexity 
is further increased where the safety argument must also consider the rules for 
the exchange of data between systems, developed in section 6.5. 
In contrast, this research proposes a data validation policy where the 
responsibility to ensure that the data integrity requirements have been met rests 
with the user of the data encourages those responsible for the system to identify 
and define a boundary. In defining the boundary, this allows evaluation of the 
complexity of any proposed safety argument for the data component. 
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8 Developing the data component of safety systems 
8.1 Developing data-driven systems 
The design, development, implementation and maintenance of data-driven 
systems are complex undertakings. These complexities come about in part 
through the shared use of common data definitions and datasets. The system 
designer is faced with an extensive array of options when selecting a solution to 
any particular problem. In many instances the designer is constrained by the 
problem context, which may also contain existing solutions. 
8.2 Data development 
The treatment of data as a separated systems component requires that data be 
treated with appropriate rigour. This requires the developer to address data 
development. Perhaps one approach is to examine the provision of data for 
safety systems through the development lifecycle and then to examine data 
provision outside the development arena. 
8.3 A development lifecycle for data 
8.3.1 Data developed within the system development arena 
The conventional view of data tends to pay little attention to the design, 
production or verification of data. It is argued elsewhere in this executive 
summary that data should be treated as a separate system component, and 
from this argument it follows that this data component should be developed with 
the same rigour as the other components of the system. Logic then dictates 
that the data component should also be subject to a development lifecycle 
model. This research recognises that data may be drawn from sources external 
to the development lifecycle and may also be provided either through a data 
production process or extracted from external information systems. Once 
obtained this data may be processed within a data supply chain to create one or 
more application datasets. These application datasets will then be installed to 
form the complete build for one or more instances of the system. In addition 
data-driven applications may be used (and re-used) in many installations and 
therefore the design of the data component may be separate from its 
implementation. 
This research recognises that the size, scale and complexity of modem systems 
development demands that the series of processes and activities required to 
create these systems are set out so that effective control may be applied to the 
system development. This research uses theV' lifecycle model as the basis for 
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the discussion of the lifecycle issues affecting the development of data. This 
data development is not only concerned with the data architecture but also with 
the means of data provision. The design, implementation and provision of data 
may require extensive co-ordination of activities, processes and personnel far 
beyond that which can be shown in a simple V lifecycle model. 
The'V'lifecycle model is used to describe how a development project moves 
from requirements, through system design, component design, component 
implementation, component integration (assembly) into system integration and 
finally system test. A particular feature of theV' lifecycle model is the linking of 
the left hand and right hand sides of the V (as shown in Figure 8 below). In the 
V lifecycle model the requirements are stated at the commencement of the 
project at the top-left-hand of theV lifecycle model. The activities associated 
with the demonstration that the requirements have been satisfied are 
concurrently defined at the top right hand side of the "V" lifecycle model. In this 
way the top-left-hand activities of the 'V lifecycle model are linked to the top- 
right-hand activities of the V lifecycle model. 
As the project progresses down the left-hand side of the 'V lifecycle model, each 
level of theV is linked with activities on the right hand side. For example 
system design would be linked to system test, subsystem design would be linked 
to subsystem integration and component design linked to component test. 
Design reviews will be held at identified points on the'V'lifecycle model to 
provide assurance that the development process have been executed with 
appropriate rigour and that the project deliverables are available for 
examination. The design reviews on the left-hand side of theVare also linked 
to review points on the right hand-side to demonstrate that the requirements 
associated with each level of the development have been delivered. 
This research has developed the following generic and application data lifecycle 
models. In following the pattern set out by the softwareV lifecycle model, 
similar hazard and risk analyses are carried out throughout the data 
development. This requires an explicit statement of the data safety 
requirements, the data architecture, the data design, and the data integrity 
requirements. The data architecture and data design are therefore significant 
factors in the determination of the data integrity requirements, as would be the 
case for the software and hardware components of the system. 
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A possible development lifecycle for the data component is shown in Figure 8 
below. 
Figure 8: A generic development lifecycle for the data component 
Data generated (or collected) outside the system development arena 
Implicit in the data lifecycle, in Figure 8, is the consideration that the data will 
be generated (or collected) at the same time as the system development. While 
this may be true for some data components, a majority of the application data is 
likely to be produced or collected outside the development environment. This is 
based upon the assumption that multiple instances of a data-driven system may 
be employed in order to reuse the hardware and software design (component or 
complete application), either because the system is designed as a product for 
multiple customers, or through informal re-use. Therefore the same group of 
development products may be custornised through the use of data to the specific 
requirements of an individual application. 
To accommodate these data requirements demands that the data development 
lifecycle be modified to accommodate this change in intended use. The modified 
lifecycle should recognise two distinct phases of system development; firstly the 
development of the generic system and secondly the application development, 
as shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9: An application data fifecycle 
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This application data lifecycle highlights a number of difficulties with this 
approach. The application development assumes that the system development 
deliverables are available and contain all the required information as to the data 
required, including any sensitivity to data error, omission or commission. If the 
circumstances of the application development identify additional hazards or 
changes in the frequency of occurrence or severity of outcome of any possible 
accident, then the manner in which changes to the system or its hardware, 
software or data components are to be affected are unclear. 
8.4 The integration of the generic and application data lifecycle models 
within a system development 
The'V' lifecycle model is essentially a linear model, which assumes that 
development progresses in an orderly fashion, each stage being largely complete 
(or more commonly expected to be complete) before the next stage begins. The 
V lifecycle model over-simplifies the development and production of data. 
Additional data requirements may also emerge from the design as requirements 
of the development of the hardware and software components of the system. 
This is in part due to the use (and re-use) of generic hardware and software 
components that require configuration data. 
This research has developed a timeline model to illustrate the integration of the 
hardware, software and data components with the development of the overall 
system. In Figure 10, the development of the overall system is contained within 
the Systems Engineering activities. This research proposes that the system and 
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the data architectures are created as part of the systems engineering and 
application development activities. This facilitates review of the overall system 
and data architectures as part of an integrated development process. These 
reviews are shown as the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and Detailed Design 
Review (DDR) along with other lifecycle stage gates in Figure 10. 
gab ge «b 41» 
Application Development 
Figure 10: A system development timeline 
The successful completion of the Systems Engineering PDR allows for the 
initiation of the application development. In a particular enterprise there may 
be many such applications, but for clarity only one application development is 
shown. This research proposes that Data Provision be initiated at this time. To 
support Data Production, Data Provision requires tools and infrastructure 
elements to facilitate the formation of the data supply chain. The tools and 
infrastructure elements are likely to be software applications supported by 
people and procedures. These software applications will be developed as part of 
the software development lifecycle. Data Production may employ many data 
provision tools to form and manage the data supply chain. The arrangement of 
these data provision tools is informed (and may be directed) by the Enterprise 
Data Processing Model (EDPM). The purpose of Data Provision and Data 
Production is the delivery of the required application dataset to the application 
system. The use of an EDPM is proposed in DO 200A [18]. 
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The Enterprise Data Architecture (EDA) is a strong influence upon the 
development of the applications, data provision and data production. The 
structure and nature of the EDA is also a significant influence upon the ability of 
the enterprise to adapt. In the circumstance where the EDA is based upon fixed 
structures, interfaces or legacy systems, the EDA restricts the ability of the 
enterprise to change and therefore the EDA further reinforces, and to some 
extent entrenches, the organisation. Conversely where the EDA contains 
adaptable elements, then the enterprise may employ this adaptability to evolve 
based upon business needs. 
This adaptability also requires careful management, as the service (or product) 
offered by the enterprise is the basis for existing and future revenue. In such 
organisations the EDA will contain elements to facilitate the design of the service 
(or product), and therefore this data design will be enacted through data 
production. The Air Traffic Management (ATM) domain is an example of such a 
system. The design house is the national air transport authority (in the UK this 
airspace design (in terms of overall air route structures and categories of 
airspace) is in the hands of a joint CAA/MoD department). The design house 
creates the description of the airways and the procedures required for their 
operation (these are rules that describe the limitations of each airway as well as 
rules for the connection of different airways). In addition National Air Traffic 
Services (NATS) requires additional configuration information such as 
sectorisation to add to its ATM systems. In this ATM system it is desirable to 
create the design of the service provision that may be loaded into the system at 
regular intervals (every 28 days in the case of the ATM AIRAC cycle). It is 
therefore undesirable and expensive to validate the software and hardware 
components of the system every time the new dataset is loaded. Therefore the 
application data design is required to be independent of the hardware and 
software components of the system, within a pre-defined set of criteria. The 
data design is supported by data production. 
8.5 The logistics required to implement regular data updates 
Significant logistics may be required to ensure that the operational dataset is 
brought into effect on a certain date (and time of day), and that all those 
operational systems use the active dataset (or derived dataset), until such time 
as the dataset is superseded. The lifecycle should include requirements to 
support strong configuration management and design reviews at the lifecycle 
stage gates to ensure that data integrity is maintained. Stage gates may also 
be convenient landmarks in the development environment to enforce 
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Configuration Management baselines. An idealised circular data update lifecycle 
is depicted in Figure 11. 
Figure 11: An idealised operational data provision lifecycle model 
The data assessment may not be performed upon the current dataset until one 
or more data lifecycles are completed. To demonstrate a continuous series of 
circuits of the data lifecycle the model has been laid out to present a number of 
the data cycles so the relationship between cycle #N and its predecessors cycles 
may be shown. A series of data cycles are depicted in Figure 12. 
Data Production 
#N-1 
Data Design #N+l 
Data Data Data 
Assessment Assessment Assessment 
Figure 12: A more practical view of operational data provision 
The data assessment may contribute corrective actions from one or more 
previous data cycles. These corrective actions are feedback into the design and 
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production phases of the cycle. This is a simplified view of the data cycle as 
prior to the data becoming operational the data should be subject to data 
assurance activities such as verification and validation. Where the data integrity 
requirements demand it, the data should also be used in a simulator with a 
range of operational conditions. These operational conditions should not only 
consider normal operation but also a variety of degraded (and emergency) 
modes. 
8.6 The execution of application dataset updates during the working 
lifetime of the system 
The development arena is likely to encompass the development of the system, 
the tools to support data provision and data production. It is also likely that 
development activity gives way to maintenance after successful completion of 
the Factory and Site Acceptance Testing (FAT / SAT) as the system enters 
operational service. 
Once the system is deployed, data updates may be undertaken during the 
working lifetime of the system. Figure 13 depicts these data updates. 
Figure 13: Providing data updates during the working lifetime 
The process shown in Figure 13, delivers data to the operational system. This 
data is loaded into the application (or system) using the application data tool. 
These data updates are likely to take place outside the development arena and 
hence away from the rigour of the people and processes that created the 
system. This research observes that what is not clear is whether the application 
(or system) will be subject to test before being returned to operational service. 
Alastair Faulknerýý 2004 Page 47 of 106 
Data Integrity: An often ignored aspect of safety systems 
CF299/01/077-1.04 
8.7 Integrating application development with data provision 
An important consideration in the operational life of a data-driven system will be 
the ability to update the application dataset. At this update the application 
dataset is 'taken into use'. 
The provision of data during the operational lifetime of the system will be 
undertaken using the application data lifecycle (shown in the bottom left hand 
quadrant of Figure 9). The contrast between the application development and 
provision of operational data is that these processes are likely to be executed by 
separate groups of people. This separation between these groups may lead, at 
best, to misunderstanding the data integrity requirements. An important part of 
this understanding is the sensitivity of the application to different types of data 
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Figure 14: Provision of data by the developers and the data providers 
One aspect of data provision is the use of a data supply chain. The 
requirements of the design and assessment of the data supply chain are 
addressed in the following section. 
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k, 9 The design and assessment of a data supply chain 
9.1 Data provision using a data supply chain 
This research proposes the use of a data supply chain to satisfy the 
requirements of data provision. The data supply chain used in this research is 
based upon the aeronautical data chain described in DO 200A [18]. This has 
then been developed into a generic data supply chain. This research supports 
this generic data supply chain by proposing a design and assessment method. 
9.2 The DO 200A data supply chain 
The components of the data supply chain are described by DO 200A as phases. 
The DO 200A phases are receive, assemble, translate, select, format and 
distribute. 
An example description of a data supply chain might be where data is received 
from the origin and assembled into a database. Data Is then extracted from the 
database, translated into the application format and subsequently stored in the 
(application) database. Data is then selected from the (application) database 
into a tailored subset. This tailored subset is then formatted and stored. The 
formatted data is distributed to the application [18]. 
Each phase is executed to satisfy a set of specified criteria. Data is verified 
against these criteria and where the data fails to meet the criteria corrective 
action may be instigated and an error log recorded. 
The author contributes the consolidate and transform phases to this description 
to complete the functionality required for a general-purpose data supply chain. 
A further contribution is the description of a method for the design of a data 
supply chain, including a graphical representation. When considering the design 
of a data supply chain it may become evident that combinations of phases are 
used several times. These phases may be collected together In formations to 
provide combinational re-use. 
9.3 Generallsing the DO 200A data supply chain 
To generalise the DO 200A data supply chain the author considers that two 
further phases are required. These are the consolidate and transform phases. 
The consolidate phase selects a data from a database based upon predetermined 
criteria, processing the data to produce a limited number of data elements based 
upon the selected data. An example of the proposed use of the consolidate 
phase would be to provide a data element representing a property of the 
selected data such as minima, maxima or average value. 
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The transform phase takes as its Input a dataset, its purpose is to apply 
verification criteria In order to create evidence to justify the use of the dataset 
based upon the data Integrity requirements of the consuming system(s). 
9.4 Defining a graphical representation for a data supply chain 
Appendix C provides a graphical representation as a means of presenting the 
data supply chain as a directed graph. For ease of representation standard 
flowchart symbols are re-used, as these are commonly available in a number of 
commercial diagramming packages. 
9.5 A design and assessment method for a data supply chain 
This research proposes that the design of a well-formed data supply chain 
should take Into account not only the technology aspects of the integrity 
requirements, but should also consider the organisation which will execute 
procedures (including manual processes) to support these data supply chains. 
The execution of these manual processes may be a source of data errors. The 
opportunity for data errors may arise from a range of support services such as 
the administration of backup and recovery to human error during data entry. 
Therefore the capability of the organisation to supply data of the required 
Integrity must include those components of the supply chain within its 
responsibility and all the processes used to support it. 
A data supply chain should be "fit for purpose,, and contain only those elements 
required to supply data of the required Integrity. Short supply chains, involving 
fewer components, are to be preferred over long (and possibly complex) supply 
chains. Much of the opportunity for optimisation is dependent upon the re-use 
of verification and validation criteria, the length of the data supply chain and its 
complexity. Short supply chains may not contain many re-used items, while 
long or complex supply chains, which receive data from many sources, may 
present significant opportunities for optimisation. The criteria for optimisation 
are based upon the number of Instances of use and the integrity required from 
the supply chain. 
The design process for the data supply chain should: 
1) Identify the data origins. 
11) Identify the (organisational, legal, and political) boundaries within the 
supply chain. 
iii) Identify the process and adaptation phases required. 
IV) Apportion the Integrity requirements along the data supply chain. 
V) IdentlfV evidence requirements. 
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vi) Specify corrective action processes. 
vii) Assess the design of the data supply chain. 
Additional detail of this design method is provided in Appendix C 
9.6 Common formations in the data supply chain 
9.6.1 The example of data passed across the system boundary 
The confidence in the integrity of the data within the data supply chain is based 
upon the available evidence. However where data is passed from an external 
organisation such evidence may not always accompany the data. To illustrate 
this point the situation of data passed across the boundary, with supporting 
evidence, is contrasted with uncorroborated data passed across the boundary is 
developed in the following subsections. Uncorroborated data will require 
verification. In such cases verification may be difficult as, using the above 
description, no evidence is presented to support the data integrity claim. One 
option is the use of default values to separate (or even replace) low integrity 
data elements within the dataset with high integrity default elements during the 
verification process. However, the use of default values may significantly 
influence the data integrity that may be attained as the dataset may become 
sterile. 
9.6.2 Data passed across the boundary with supporting evidence 
In order to produce the desired distribution media the required tailored data set 
is created (select), this tailored dataset is then formatted (format) and 
transferred to the distribution media (distribute). The distribution media is 
passed across the boundary, received (receive) and stored. This fragment of a 
data supply chain is shown in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15: Data passed across a boundary with supporting evidence 
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At each phase the verification criteria are applied and any errors are logged into 
the corrective action system. The corrective action system may correct a 
localised failure such as a 'bad block' on the distribution media in which case the 
error is corrected by re-transmission. Where the corrective action is not 
localised, the corrective action is passed to an earlier stage for correction. 
Evidence accompanies the data in its passage across the boundary either as 
references (to items such as to test certificates) or the actual evidence (such as 
analysis results). 
9.6.3 Uncorroborated data passed across the boundary 
When data is passed across a boundary without the evidence to support its 
claimed integrity, additional measures are required to establish the integrity of 
this data. The integrity of the data must be established before its use. On 
receipt the distribution media is verified for transmission errors (by the receive 
phase). The lack of evidence then gives rise to the requirement for a transform 
phase. This fragment of a data supply chain is shown in Figure 16. 
RýIvo 
crtt. t. 
Tmmfý 
crhode 
D-j 
anz*MM x 
M. dbýd- 
1'u1 
G) 111 -im -m -- - 
1 Rective Transgom E- repots Eý reports o- Irl -, - 
Figure 16: Data passed across a boundary without supporting evidence 
The data is processed by the transform phase, based upon the verification 
criteria, to produce evidence to support the integrity claim. The only evidence 
available to support the claimed integrity is that provided by the receive and 
transform phases. In some cases corrective actions may not be passed across 
the boundary (to the data source), leaving open the question of how to correct 
this uncorroborated data. 
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9.6.4 Verification and the use of default values 
V-ý17 I,,, 
9.7 
9.8 
The repeated application of default values and data elements to sanitise data 
may render the dataset sterile. Such a sterile dataset may contain little useful 
information representing the real world and hence may be considered useless. 
The basis of the use of default references and data elements therefore requires 
extensive justification and should be documented to a level commensurate with 
the risk of the introduction of error and its possible consequence. Any synthesis 
must assume the most restrictive form to be consistent with a conservative risk 
management policy. Any inclusion of default data elements in the transformed 
dataset should be justified by assessment and where necessary by direct 
comparison with the real world. 
Abstraction In data provision 
Sections 9.6.2 and 9.6.3 have described data passed across the boundary 
without any consideration of the abstract hierarchy that may be implied in the 
processing of data within the data supply chain. Data of higher abstraction may 
be produced through the selection and processing of data of lower abstraction. 
This abstract data is typically a single value or a reduced number of values 
representing a consolidation of the selected data. The ability to produce data of 
a higher abstraction gives rise to the requirement for a consolidate phase [32]. 
The data supply chain may then implement a data processing model [33] 
including several levels of abstraction, which may also consist of signal 
processing elements [32]. 
A data processing model for the data supply chain 
An enterprise may employ a number of applications that are required to share 
data, based upon a common data supply chain. This requirement to share data 
may also require the design and definition of an Enterprise Data Processing 
Model. The Enterprise Data Processing Model provides visibility of the nature of 
data shared between these applications and also provides a means to Identify 
and enforce the rules governing the exchange of data between systems of 
differing integrity. 
Figure 17 is a fragment of Figure 10 (page 44) and illustrates the relationship 
between the Enterprise Data Architecture, the Enterprise Data Processing Model 
and the Application Data Architecture. 
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Figure 17: A fragment of the system development lifecycle. 
In this research the Enterprise Data Architecture (EDA) is considered as the 
% master' data definition and that both the Application Data Architecture and 
Enterprise Data Processing Model are derived from the EDA. 
9.9 Concerns over the stability of a data supply chain 
This research observes that the data supply chain may be considered to be a 
form of signal processing as information flows from the data source to the 
consuming systems. This abstraction of the data supply chain is shown in Figure 
18, which shows how detected errors may be fed back for correction. In some 
cases the corrective action may be fed forward (positive feedback) or fed 
backwards (negative feedback). This correction may occur locally within a 
limited group of phases, within the organisation or along the data supply chain. 
m 
Figure 18: A fragment of the data supply chain to illustrate feedback. 
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Treating the data supply chain as a feedback control system facilitates design 
and analysis to determine its properties (see Atkinson [38], "Feedback control 
theory for Engineers"). It should be borne in mind that the time constants for 
such a feedback system might be in the order of days, weeks or even months, 
rather than the hours or seconds commonly associated with control systems 
which control process plant. 
Two of these properties are: 
Stability (based upon known arrangements of positive or negative 
feedback); and, 
ii) Response (usually expressed as the damping factor, to describe the 
response to a step input). 
The use of the feedback control model allows the recursive use of this model, as 
the control system itself may comprise one or more sub-systems. 
9.10 Data ownership, liability for data errors and risk management 
A data supply chain may extend across many organisational and political 
boundaries. An example of such a data supply chain is shown in Figure 19. This 
Data Supply Chain transports data across two organisations (shown as the pale 
yellow boxes). In each organisation data is received, processed, and formatted 
for delivery to subsequent elements of the data supply chain. Data may be 
owned by the each organisation, particularly if that organisation 'adds value' to 
the data through processes applied to the data. 
1fl 
Figure 19: A data supply chain crossing organisational boundaries 
Using the general description of a Data Supply Chain shown in Figure 19, this 
research observes that ownership is a complex issue as data may originate from 
a number of organisational and political bodies. In addition changes in 
ownership may result from data processing such as consolidation to produce a 
higher data abstraction. For example, operational considerations may allow 
ownership to change based upon pre-defined criteria such as handover into 
maintenance and hand back into operation upon completion of maintenance. 
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Data provision requires that organisational and political boundaries be 
documented, including responsibilities, ownership, intellectual property rights, 
legal constraints, liabilities and restrictions on use. The misuse of a dataset may 
attract liability to the data provider, which is outside the scope of supply. The 
data supply chain may include a data processing model in which data is 
processed including consolidation into higher abstractions. The ownership of 
these consolidated data items should also be established as this consolidated 
data also attracts the attributes of ownership, liability and risk and may 
subsequently be passed across organisational boundaries. 
In addition, evidence (or references to evidence) should also accompany the 
data to support any integrity claim. Corrective actions may also be passed back 
along the data supply chain. For example, the ownership of corrective actions 
for errors found in data may be local or passed down the data supply chain to 
the data origin. Any corrective action placed upon the original source may still 
not yield data of suitable integrity. If the dataset is corrected locally then the 
connection between the input dataset and the delivered dataset may become 
untenable as the number of corrections rise. In these circumstances the 
corrected dataset may become a data origin it its own right and separate from 
the original dataset, attracting the attributes of ownership, liability and risk. 
Therefore the design options for corrective actions may require justification 
based upon the integrity requirements of the data and its intended use. 
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10 Discussion 
10.1 The treatment of data used by safety systems 
This research has undertaken a wide-ranging overview of the use (and abuse) of 
data used by safety systems. Examination of the treatment of data in existing 
literature [5] and a survey of industrial practice [20] provides a stark insight into 
the conventional view of data as simply an aspect of software. 
Treating data as an aspect of software or simply failing to recognise the 
influence of data (and data errors) and their potential effect on the overall 
system often exposes those systems to risk. The risk associated with data (and 
data errors) is often untreated in the safety justification for such systems and 
may be regarded as an'unattended' risk. In some cases the risk associated with 
a lack of data integrity has been a significant factor that has led to harm (people 
have been killed [13,21 and 22] and many others remain at risk [23 to 25]). 
The survey of industrial practice [20] has shown that there is little consistency in 
the methods used for data development. In addition the treatment of data has 
often been confined to data development, without recognising that data is often 
provided from outside the development arena [21]. The proposition of this 
research (see section 1.2) is to treat data as a separate and distinct component. 
This represents a novel paradigm or conceptual framework. One of the 
properties of this data paradigm is that it simplifies the treatment of data and 
also facilitates examination of the structure and complexity of the safety 
arguments for data and the systems that depend upon data. This data 
paradigm requires the support of strategies and techniques for the treatment of 
data. One of these strategies is the use of generic data and application data 
lifecycle models. These strategies and techniques are discussed later in this 
section. 
10.2 A conventional view of data 
A conventional view of data fosters a number of assumptions associated with the 
cost and availability of the data. An example of this approach is a large 
infrastructure project that in 1998 proposed to use generic elements and 
systems as a means to reduce the acquisition cost of the overall system. 
However, the decision to use (or re-use) these generic elements was based on 
the assumption that the required data was readily available at little cost and that 
data changes could be made without the need for re-validation of the data or the 
system as a whole. These assumptions have subsequently proved to be 
unfounded. 
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Many engineers seem reluctant to recognise the importance of data integrity. In 
many cases data is assumed to be correct, with any errors being seen as the 
responsibility of the data supplier [20]. In order to control data integrity it is 
necessary for an enterprise to manage all aspects of data integrity. This 
research proposes that this control also requires that the enterprise develops 
and manages one or more data architectures. Data production also becomes a 
significant aspect of the management and control of data integrity. 
Perhaps one of the reasons why data is given so little prominence is that many 
engineers make the tacit assumption that data is simply an aspect of software 
and is therefore covered by the general guidance given (1,5,6,19 and 20]. 
Certainly, many definitions of software include data (and documentation) within 
its remit [1,6 and 19]. However, it is quite clear that in many cases the data 
component is not developed alongside more conventional software, and is not 
developed with the same degree of care (20,21,23 to 25,30 and 31]. 
10.3 A data paradigm - the treatment of data as a separate systems 
component 
Modern software development practices contain conceptual frameworks that are 
often taken for granted. Industry specific [27 and 34] and generic standards 
[19] are based upon a broad consensus that the software development 
conceptual framework comprises a development lifecycle model that is combined 
with techniques and measures recommended based upon the proposed system 
(and the technological solutions required to implement it) and the required 
system integrity. This consensus is also represented at the system level in best 
practice guidance [6 and 35]. 
The data paradigm, proposed in this research, draws on the software consensus. 
The conceptual framework for data requires that: 
i) Data is adequately defined and its requirements are specified; 
ii) A data lifecycle model is identified; 
iii) Strategies for the implementation of data are identified; and 
iv) Data techniques and measures are identified for use in each of the stages 
of the lifecycle model. 
Data may also be exchanged between applications. This represents a departure 
from the parallel drawn with software. This places a requirement on the data 
paradigm to address the exchange of data between systems. 
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10.4 Defining data for use by safety systems 
Good practice requires that the data component of a system be organised into 
collections of related data items and structures; this is usually known as a data 
dictionary. A well organised and well structured data dictionary facilitates 
navigation and allows examination of related items. A complex system may 
require an extensive data dictionary. This research has proposed a series of 
requirements that extend the types of information to be recorded alongside the 
definition of data in a data dictionary (see section 4.2). Recording a data 
classification with each data dictionary entry provides an indication of how that 
data item will be used (see section 4.3). The data classification takes account of 
static and dynamic data elements as well as that data which is used to describe 
the future use of the system (schedule data). 
Where these data items or data structures are passed between systems or 
between layers of the layered model any errors in this data may be propagated 
across the overall system. The layered model provides a means to visualise the 
use made of this data and facilitates consideration of how the propagation of 
data errors will be detected and controlled. One aspect of this control is to 
propose a set of rules for the exchange of data between systems of differing 
integrity (see section 6.5 and [30]). These rules form the basis of design 
criteria so that the appropriate detection and controls may be embodied within 
the application (or system) design. 
10.5 The determination of data Integrity requirements 
Over the years the various safety-related industries have gained considerable 
experience in assessing the safety of systems. The general characteristics of 
hardware and software are well understood and many designers are very 
experienced at partitioning between these two resources. Standards such as 
IEC 61508 [1] and best practice guidance such as ESM [6] give detailed 
guidance on techniques for the determination of integrity requirements. Using 
these techniques, it is possible to have reasonable confidence that all the 
hazards associated with the safety functions have been identified. However 
these standards and best practice guides do not address the determination of 
data integrity requirements. 
This research has described a method for determining the data integrity 
requirements (see section 5). This method uses an adaptation of the commonly 
used Functional Failure Analysis technique [2] (which is itself a variation on 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis). This research has also contributed a series 
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of functional failure guidewords for data to be used in conducting the Functional 
Failure Analysis (see section 5.4, [47] and [52]). 
10.6 Identifying and managing the desirable properties of data 
A system possessing low coupling and high cohesion will generally possess the 
desirable design properties of resilience and stability [37]. In addition, low 
coupling and high cohesion will generally minimise the effects that changes to 
one component may have on other components of the system. In the context of 
software this definition reflects the functionality implemented by software. 
Additional care should be exercised when considering data as the same data 
element may be used in several contexts and possibly by several applications or 
systems. In each context this data element will be ascribed subtly different 
meanings. Therefore changes to data may give rise to unexpected and possibly 
undesirable behaviour based upon the context and use made of the data. 
The properties of low coupling and high cohesion have been considered self 
evident for both good software and good systems design, appearing In many 
texts. However anecdotal evidence suggests that the same general consensus 
cannot be said to exist for data used by data-intensive systems [20]. Data, In 
common with hardware and software, is a system component and broad 
parallels can be drawn as to the desirable properties for good design of data. 
The role and influence of data (and data error) may be reviewed in the context 
of the layered systems model [29] to determine the influence of the application 
and the wider system (including the data it produces and consumes) [36]. A 
system visualised using the layered model might reveal that one or more data 
attributes are used in more than one layer of the model, and that any change to 
these data attributes may influence one or more real-time safety functions. In 
such circumstances this research would propose that additional design elements 
are required to implement mechanisms to manage change of the data attribute 
without adversely affecting the safety of the individual or overall system. 
10.7 The selection of a data lifecycle model 
A reasonable starting point in the consideration of such a lifecycle model is the 
software development lifecycle given within IEC 61508 [19]. IEC 61508 uses 
the example of theV'lifecycle model, with which most engineers will be 
familiar [411. 
The use of other lifecycle models is a matter of choice of the Engineer, the 
organisation or where data is to be supplied through the use of a data supply 
chain by agreement with those involved in data provision. Perhaps one of the 
Alastair Faulkner'O 2004 Page 60 of 106 
Data Integrity: An often Ignored aspect of safety systems 
CF299/01/077-1.04 
ý-- I-ý 
most significant aspects of this research is the recognition that data design and 
development may be separate from the data provision [44]. 
As described in section 8.3, the design and development of data may require 
extensive co-ordination of activities, processes and personnel far beyond that 
which can be shown in a simple V lifecycle model. This research proposes that 
it is not sufficient to assume that the development of data forms an integral part 
of the overall system development process. The separation of data development 
and data provision requires that the data Integrity requirements must be 
communicated from those responsible for the development of a safety system, 
to those responsible for the provision of the associated data. 
10.8 Lifecycle models for generic and application data 
As well as the generic data development lifecycle model, this research has 
developed an application data lifecycle model (see section 8.3.2). This 
application data lifecycle model recognises that the left hand side of theV 
model is likely to be executed in the development arena and that the application 
data will use the data design elements as the basis for data provision. 
In common with the hardware and software components of the system, the 
techniques and measures employed within the generic data development 
lifecycle model will contribute to the demonstration that systematic development 
processes have been applied to the design of the data component. These 
techniques and measures will have been chosen to match the rigour required by 
the data integrity requirements. 
10.9 The design and structure of the data component 
10.9.1 The interrelated nature of the application and enterprise data architectures 
The design, development, implementation and maintenance of a large scale 
data-driven systems is a complex undertakings. These complexities come about 
in part through the shared use of common data definitions and datasets. In 
such a system an individual application will be required to co-operate with, and 
be an integral part of the overall system or enterprise. 
A data model for an application, and the resulting dataset may contain hundreds 
of thousands of data items, often with complex relationships. The overall 
system (or enterprise) may contain many such applications and ensuring the 
integrity of all this data is then far from trivial [4]. 
DO 200A [18] describes an Enterprise Data Processing Model (EDPM). This 
research draws from the description of the EDPM a requirement for the 
management of data models at the application and enterprise levels. This 
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research proposes that the Enterprise Data Architecture should describe the data 
model for the enterprise as a whole and that an Application Data Architecture 
should correspondingly describe the data model for each application. 
The description of the data lifecycle model (Figure 10 and Figure 17) depicts the 
relationship between the data structures in the Enterprise Data Architecture and 
a number of Application Data Architectures as well as the Enterprise Data 
Processing Model. 
10.9.2 The design and control of the Enterprise Data Architecture 
The design of the Enterprise Data Architecture should address the requirements 
of the application data as well as the requirements of data update during normal 
system operation. These requirements may involve the ability to change the 
Enterprise Data Architecture to reflect changes in the revenue patterns of the 
enterprise. The Enterprise Data Architecture should therefore contain the 
inherent design properties of modularity and independence. Therefore all 
systems, which use all, or part of the Enterprise Data Architecture or a dataset 
derived from it, must register their interest in the data dictionary that describes 
the Enterprise Data Architecture. The register of interest should identify each 
data element, structure, data reference or attribute together with its respective 
integrity requirements. 
This should be undertaken as part of data definition and this research has 
described the requirements of these dependencies in the definition of a data 
dictionary (see section 4.1). 
10.9.3 The design and control of the Application Data Architecture 
The architectural design of an application should clearly identify the data 
elements within the system, distinct from the hardware and software 
components [5]. Therefore, data should also be described by an appropriate 
data model that is self-sufficient, clear, analysable and unambiguous [5]. In 
addition data that is derived from external sources, or data that is developed 
separately from the safety-related system itself, should be subject to the same 
requirements of verification and documentation, as data produced as an integral 
part of the project [5]. The design and data should be clearly described in the 
lifecycle of the system and in terms of data as a separate systems component. 
10.9.4 The development of the Enterprise Data Processing Model 
DO 200A [18] describes an Enterprise Data Processing Model and an 
implementation of an aeronautical data supply chain using phases that may be 
combined to provide the required application dataset. The DO 200A aeronautical 
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data chain has been extended into a generalised data supply chain in the 
submission Data Provision [32]. 
Each phase of the data supply chain may be implemented as software and as 
such will be subject to the software development lifecycle. An Enterprise Data 
Processing Model may be extensive as its definition may contain the 
requirements and data definitions of many application, systems and 
organisations. 
10.10 Consideration of the safety arguments for generic and application data 
10.10.1 Safety arguments for data 
The separation of data development and application data provision leads directly 
to the consideration of the nature and structure of the safety arguments 
required to support the data component. As the development and provision of 
data are likely to be undertaken in two separate arenas, this research proposes 
that the safety argument will comprise of at least two components, one for data 
development and one for data provision. 
10.10.2 The management and control of data updates 
A desirable feature of an existing systems environment would be an existing 
Enterprise Data Architecture. Where an Enterprise Data Architecture does not 
exist, the application developer should consider the structure and nature of any 
safety justification, as without an Enterprise Data Architecture the construction 
of the safety case may be difficult. For example, a source of error may occur 
when more than one system or application updates shared data. Good design 
practice requires that only one system be permitted to change the data; 
therefore requests to change data are passed to the responsible system, which 
validates the request and updates the data as required. Hence, the authority 
and responsibility for changes to data are set out in the Enterprise Data 
Architecture. An alternative would be to allow more than one system to change 
data. In the alternative arrangement, these data updates may induce data 
errors. Under this alternative arrangement establishing the liability for any data 
errors may also prove problematic. 
Therefore the management and control of data updates and changes to data 
models may be a significant influence on the nature and complexity of the data 
safety arguments. 
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'10.10.3 Safety arguments for data development 
The design of a data-driven system may be constrained by issues associated 
with compatibility with existing systems. There may be no recorded integrity 
requirements for existing systems. Therefore an existing systems environment 
may require extensive effort to establish the integrity requirements of the 
existing systems as a precursor to establishing the integrity requirements for the 
new systems. Once the integrity requirements for the existing systems are 
established assessment of the existing datasets might well identify significant 
shortfalls in the data integrity of the existing data. Indeed many of the pre- 
existing systems may benefit from improvements in data quality (as a pre- 
requisite for data integrity). 
The safety arguments for data development are likely to parallel those for 
software. The data development safety argument will show that a valid set of 
requirements has been documented and that the data component has 
demonstrated compliance with those requirements through testing. Testing may 
be demonstrated at unit (dataset) as well as integration and system levels. The 
data development safety argument should also demonstrate that an appropriate 
set of processes have been executed by suitably trained, experienced and 
competent staff [6 and 27]. 
10.10.4 Safety arguments for data provision 
In contrast with data development, the safety argument for data provision may 
be extensive. This data provision safety argument must address data 
origination, the data supply chain, the data validation policy as well as the 
demonstration that data may be updated during the normal system operation. 
This research notes that the data provision safety argument may also be 
required to address the organisational and political influences on data Integrity. 
In addition, the data provision safety argument may be influenced by the design 
and structure of the data component. 
10.10.5 A safety argument for data update during normal operation 
An additional safety argument may also be required to address the process of 
performing data updates during normal system operation. 
10.10.6 The Influence of data validation on the structure and nature of the safety 
argument 
The strategy for data validation may be a significant influence on the structure 
and complexity of the safety argument for data (see section 7). DO 200A [18] 
proposes that the responsibility to ensure that the data integrity requirements 
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have been met rests with the user of the data. An adaptation of the DO 200A 
'responsibility' policy for data validation encourages those responsible for the 
system to identify and define a boundary. In defining the boundary, this allows 
evaluation of the complexity of any proposed safety argument for the data 
component. 
10.11 Data provision using a data supply chain 
A data supply chain may be used to transport the data from its origin to the 
consuming system. Such data supply chains may be explicit in the case of 
systems that conform to DO 200A [18]. These data supply chains may also be 
unrecognised and implicit where data entry is separate from the consuming 
system [311. 
Data may be provided either on a batch basis or as a continuous process (or as 
a mixture of the two). Any errors detected in this data should then be passed 
through the corrective action process, where errors may be corrected In the 
received dataset or in some future dataset. Where these data errors affect the 
operation of the system, additional operating procedures may be required upon 
discovery of any data errors. These additional procedures may represent an 
additional workload for the system operators. 
This research observed that if data from an existing system is to be re-used In a 
safety-related system, additional measures are required to establish its integrity. 
This may require extensive off-line processing to produce sufficient evidence to 
support a claim that the required integrity has been attained. After the system 
enters service these off-line data processes (and metrics) may be required in 
order to ensure that the required system integrity is maintained. Therefore the 
process for data provision should be designed to support the capability of the 
organisation to supply, meet, and maintain the data Integrity requirements. 
10.12 Rules for the exchange of data between systems of differing Integrity 
This research asserts that it is undesirable for a low integrity system to pass 
data to a high integrity system without that data being subject to 
verification [30]. Clearly this low integrity data, by definition, is more likely to 
exhibit a data error rate greater than that required by the high integrity system. 
Once data is treated as a separate component these requirements become self- 
evident based upon the data definition and data integrity requirements of each 
system. 
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10.13 The design and construction of the data supply chain 
The design and construction of the information processing within the data supply 
chain may give rise to additional complexity. The use of the consolidate phase 
allows the production of additional datasets which contain abstract data derived 
from existing data within the data supply chain. The design of the data supply 
chain will be Influenced by changes to functional interfaces, which may induce 
dependant changes in both the data requirements specification and the integrity 
requirements. 
This research notes that although expressed as a linear construction, the data 
supply chain may Include many loops reflecting organisational boundaries. Such 
organisational boundaries may produce changes of ownership of the data and 
hence responsibility and liability for data errors requires careful management. 
Error correction will be concerned with feeding back the error reports to earlier 
components of the supply chain. The recognition of corrective action as a 
feedback mechanism facilitates the analysis of stability and response of the 
supply chain to change In the input data. Corrective actions may also produce 
additional corrections. Such further changes may exacerbate the original 
perturbation leading to multiple changes and possible instability. 
Many organisations are likely to participate in the provision of data. In order to 
support a data supply chain an organisation will execute processes and 
procedures and therefore any data supply chain design should be supported by a 
suitable human factors assessment. Additional data errors may be introduced 
through process failures due to human errors such as misinterpretations of 
instructions or identification labelling. 
10.14 Use of software tools and applications to support the data component 
This research notes that one or more configuration tools may be used to 
configure a system. These configuration tools should be created using a 
software development process with sufficient rigour to reduce the probability of 
configuration tool induced data errors to a minimum. 
These configuration tools may translate data into a form required by the 
application. These software tools may also be used to tailor the application to 
the operational requirements [39 and 40]. However, these are not the only 
configuration data requirements. The increasing use of generic components 
leads Inevitably to greater use of configuration data. 
Configuration data may also describe the physical arrangement of the 
computational Infrastructure (that is the computers required to support the 
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application); the logical arrangement of the services provided by operating 
systems and other software infrastructure as well as the description of the 
application environment. 
In the same way as for the definition of data, the use of the data classification 
and layered model are required to expose and make explicit the nature of data 
used by these safety systems. In addition these classifications and models allow 
standard safety engineering techniques to be adapted to data as a means to 
demonstrate the development of data safety requirements. These data safety 
requirements lead directly to the statement of data integrity requirements. 
However, note that Data design is only one element of data integrity as data 
provision is also required. 
Alastair Faulknerc 2004 Page 67 of 106 
Data Integrity: An often Ignored aspect of safety systems 
CF299/01/077-1.04 
TWOMIKONUMMMOWU "raw, 
innovation, review and dissemination 
11.1 The treatment of data prior to this research 
Welborne and Bester [17] provide perhaps the most succinct summary of the 
state of literature at the commencement of this research. In 1996 they 
commented that: 
"It appeared, after considerable searching, that almost no theoretical work or 
research study had been made of application data. Work had concentrated 
on methods of dynamic data correction in messages, database management, 
aspects such as software languages, and methods for definition of complete, 
correct and non-ambiguous software, without reference to the problem that 
incorrect application data can create. Incorrect application data can cause 
correct software, in an approved language, to have major failures in its 
performance *v [17]. 
Their comments are borne out in this research by the literature search [5] and 
survey of industrial practice [20]. ýerhaps part of this failure to address data 
comes about because data is treated simply as an aspect of software. 
11.2 Demonstration of innovation 
A significant innovation of this research has been to propose the data paradigm, 
to consider data as a separate systems component. However it Is not the only 
innovation. Perhaps the most concerning aspect of the conventional treatment 
of data is the recognition that the safety arguments used to reason about the 
use and operation of such systems are unlikely to address the specific 
requirements of data. This research identifies a number of possible safety 
arguments that concern data development, data provision and data update 
during normal system operation. This research also notes that the data 
validation policy may be a significant influence on the nature and complexity of 
these data safety arguments. 
Once data is treated as a separate system component this research asserts that 
it follows that not only should this data component attract an apportionment of 
the system integrity requirements but also that the design, development and 
provision of data should be treated with appropriate rigour. The survey of 
industrial practice [20] has demonstrated that the treatment of data is largely 
confined to data development without recognising that data is often provided 
outside the development arena (21]. DO 200A [18] provides some guidance in 
this area but tends to focus upon data preparation. 
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This research addresses the requirements of data definition by proposing an 
extension to a data dictionary. In addition this research has examined the 
classification of data proposed by Welbourne and Bester [17]. This classification 
has been adapted and extended to address data that describes the future use of 
the system (Schedule data). One of the aspects of defining data is the 
identification of data integrity requirements. This research has proposed a 
method for the determination of data integrity requirements based upon 
Functional Failure Analysis (FFA). To support the use of FFA this research has 
also proposed a series of guidewords based upon the proposed classification of 
data. 
An innovation of this research is to develop a generic data lifecycle model, and 
also an application data lifecycle model that recognises that data design and 
development may be separate from the provision of the application data. 
The data paradigm presents by definition a conceptual framework for data. 
Using a parallel with software development has suggested a number of 
strategies and techniques for use with data. However as data may also be 
exchanged between applications and hence the same data may have different 
influences dependent upon its use. This aspect of data represents a divergence 
from the parallel drawn with software. This places additional requirement on the 
data paradigm to address the exchange of data between systems. 
To facilitate the visualisation of the use (and reuse) of data this research has 
developed the layered system model [29 and 36]. The development of the 
layered systems model provides the safety assessor or approval body with a 
means of examining the scope of a safety-related system in an overall systems 
context. 
An additional innovation within this research is the development of an enhanced 
data supply chain, from the limited, industry specific form proposed within 
DO 200A [18]. This research supports the generic data supply chain through 
the definition of a design description, notation and an assessment method. To 
aid presentation this research also proposes a graphical representation of the 
data supply chain. 
The use of a graphical description of the data supply chain makes clear that data 
may be transported across one or more organisations before its delivery to the 
consuming systems. This research notes that liability for data errors may lie 
within the data supply chain, particularly if these organisations "add value' 
through the provision of data processing services. This exposes concerns over 
ownership, responsibility and inevitably costs associated with data Provision. 
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11.3 "Raising the profile'of data 
One of the aims of this research (see section 1.3.1) was to 'raise the profile' of 
data. The author has presented at the following professional forums: 
I) BCS (Northwest branch): 'Data Integrity: The use of data by safety-related 
control systems", Manchester (January 2003); 
ii) Safety Critical Systems Club (Joint Event): "Safety In the presence of data", 
London, (April 2003); and 
III) NCAF: TData Integrity: The use (and re-use) of data by safety-related 
systems", Exeter, (May 2003). 
The research has also produced fifteen papers (including one journal paper), all 
but the journal paper have also been presented at conferences. The paper 
"Data Management in Data-Driven Safety-Related Systems" [41] won the "Best 
Paper" award of the 20th International Safety System Conference 2002, Denver. 
Colorado USA. As a direct result of the best paper award the Invited paper 
"'Data: An often-ignored component of safety-related systems" was presented to 
the MoD Equipment Safety Assurance Symposium ESAS 2002 Bristol [42]. 
A growing recognition of the role of data lead to the one-day event hosted by 
the Safety Critical Systems Club "Safety in the presence of data" and Neil Storey 
and the author presented the first and last sessions respectively (see ii) above). 
In addition the System Safety Society also created a separate conference 
session on data at the 21st International Safety System Conference 2003, 
Ottawa. Canada. The author contributed two papers to the conference 
[43 and 44]. 
11.4 Dissemination and peer review 
Dissemination has not only been achieved through the fifteen published papers 
but also through the structured interviews. These structured interviews were 
conducted across a range of industries. It became abundantly clear that many 
engineers had not considered data and as a consequence that data integrity was 
being ignored across these industries. 
Perhaps the most satisfying indication of the author's success in raising the 
profile of data through research, is the testimonial received from the IEC 61508 
maintenance committee (MT12) [45] acknowledging the contribution of the 
published papers on the deliberations of the MT12 committee. The author notes 
that MT12 does not have a remit to create an additional section akin to part 3 
(software) of IEC 61508 to address the requirements of the data component. 
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12 Conclusions 
12.1 The stated alms of this research 
rvlr., UYA ý I-- II 
The stated aims of this research project include the provision of guidance for 
professionals who assess and analyse safety systems, and to 'raise the profile' of 
data as a significant element within such systems. The material provided within 
this Executive Summary would suggest that these aims have been successfully 
achieved. 
12.2 The treatment of data as a separate systems component 
This research has shown that a conventional view of data would consider data as 
simply an aspect of software. In this conventional view of data the system 
developer may not recognise the influence of data (and data errors) on the 
integrity of the overall system. This research has shown that data is indeed 
poorly addressed in standards, literature and industrial practice. Without 
directly addressing data, in particular data integrity requirements, it Is difficult to 
see how those responsible for the system safety case can argue that data-driven 
systems are tolerably safe. The conventional view of data becomes self 
reinforcing as without data integrity requirements data development and data 
provision may not attract the degree of rigour that would be required of other 
system components of a similar integrity. 
In order to break the self reinforcing argument this research proposes a data 
paradigm, that data be treated as a separate system component. This 
treatment of data requires that data (and data errors) be considered as part of 
the system safety argument. This research provides much needed guidance on 
the safety aspects of the use of, and reliance upon, data by safety systems for 
their safe operation. 
The author hopes that this work will be used as the basis of other work that will 
subsequently address issues identified within this document, and that this will be 
the foundation upon which to build a consensus as to the treatment of data used 
and relied upon by safety systems. 
Irrespective of whether data is to be treated as a separate component, the 
importance of the early identification of the consequence of data errors on the 
overall system integrity cannot be overstated. 
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12.3 Guidance for the management of the data component of safety systems 
This research proposes guidance that: 
i) Describes and classifies data used by safety systems; 
This research has proposed the requirements of a data dictionary to 
record the definition of data used by safety systems. This research has 
also proposed a taxonomy of data used by safety systems. 
These data definitions of this data should not be considered to be static, 
as they will change and evolve based upon the changing requirements of 
the systems that produce data and of the systems which use the data. 
Therefore data definition requires management and control. These 
changes will require version control of the data definitions similar to that 
used for software. 
ii) Describes a method to derive data integrity requirements; 
In this research Functional Failure Analysis (FFA) has been used as one 
method to establish Data Integrity requirements. This research also 
proposes a series of guidewords to be used with FFA for each class of 
data within the data taxonomy. 
Describes a layered model to express the use (and re-use) of data within 
a systems context; 
Large-scale systems are challenging and complex undertakings. The 
implementation and project management of large-scale systems becomes 
more difficult through increases in the coupling and complexity of the 
system itself and through its need to use and interface with many 
different data models. 
This research has proposed a layered model to express the potential 
influence of an application or system on other elements within the 
layered model. This model is then adapted to express data used within 
the model and derive the desirable properties of the data component as 
low coupling and high cohesion. 
iv) Describes the requirements of generic data and application data lifecycle 
models; 
A finding of this research is that it is common for the data component to 
be provided from outside the development environment that produced 
the hardware and software components of the system. Away from the 
rigour of the development process, and coupled with the flexibility offered 
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by malleable data descriptions, the potential for error is great. This 
potential is not limited to data used to configure the application or 
system but also applies to data passed (in both directions) across the 
system interfaces. 
Perhaps the major proposals of this research are those of the generic 
data and application data lifecycle models. The design and development 
of data may require extensive co-ordination of activities, processes and 
personnel far beyond that which can be shown in a simpleV lifecycle 
model. 
V) Describes the process of data provision 
This research has provided a description of the process of data provision 
through the development of a generic data supply chain. The description 
includes a description, notation and an assessment method for a data 
supply chain. 
vi) Describes the nature of safety arguments for data driven safety systems 
This research concludes that any system safety argument must address 
data development, data provision and data update during normal system 
operation. The data development safety argument should comprise a 
product argument addressing the validity of the data requirements and a 
demonstration that the data requirements have been met and a process 
based argument. The data development process safety argument will 
demonstrate that the data development has been undertaken using 
adequate process executed by trained, experience and competent 
personnel. 
The data provision safety argument must address data origination and 
the data supply chain and once again address both product and process 
components of the argument. An additional process based safety 
argument may be required to demonstrate that data can be safely 
updated during normal system operation. 
In addition this research observes that the data validation policy may 
have a significant influence on the nature and complexity of the safety 
arguments. 
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vii) Describes the relationship between different data models within the 
enterprise 
This research concludes that where an Enterprise is reliant upon the 
quality of the data (and the data integrity) careful consideration is 
required not only of the construction and maintenance of the Enterprise 
Data Processing Model, but also the capabilities of the enterprise and 
those organisations that supply the enterprise with data. This research 
has demonstrated that data and data errors may adversely affect the 
behaviour of the system and that they have a potential effect on the 
overall system integrity, and hence influence the Enterprise. For this 
reason, the Enterprise Data Processing Model requires a foundation of 
building blocks through which the Enterprise Data Processing Model may 
be implemented. 
The Enterprise Data Processing Model should also recognise that 
transportation of data through the data supply chain will give rise to 
changes in ownership. This research observes that such changes are also 
likely to involve changes in the liability for the data errors that these 
datasets may contain. The Enterprise Data Processing Model may be 
distributed across many systems, and hence there may also be 
organisational, political and national issues associated with the ownership 
of the data. 
Where a number of systems share a common data model, as is the case 
in the use of the Enterprise Data Architecture and Application Data 
Architecture, each of these data architectures should be the subject of 
joint review by the System Design Authority and the Application Design 
Authority in order to ensure the integrity of each application and the data 
required (and maintained) by the enterprise. Shared data definitions 
may also be an indication that the required data is derived from shared 
datasets. These shared datasets may require data processing in the form 
of a data supply chain. 
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12.4 The dissemination of the research through published papers and 
presentation to professional forums 
This research has contributed 15 papers to the literature on the subject. The 
author has also presented at professional forums. Recognition of this 
dissemination has come through an award of best paper, an invited paper and a 
one day event focused upon data hosted by the Safety Critical Systems Club. 
In addition the author has received a testimonial from the maintenance 
committee of IEC61508 acknowledging the contribution of the published papers 
from this research on their deliberations. 
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13 Recommendations 
13.1 A definition of data Integrity 
Is., -, 
This research has used the term data integrity, albeit derived from a number of 
sources, to describe a requirement for the correctness or goodness of data used 
by safety systems. The author recognises that a definition of data integrity will 
be based upon consensus within the wider safety community. It is perhaps 
fitting that the first recommendation of this research be a definition of data 
integrity to begin the process of building such a consensus. 
In many cases data integrity will be a profile of properties of a dataset that 
contains many data items, elements, structures and data references. Therefore 
data integrity should be focused on the properties of those data items that are 
used by an identified safety function. Data integrity requirements are a 
testament to the role played by data errors in the behaviour of the system and 
their potential affect on the overall system integrity. 
Ill The first recommendation of this research is a definition of data integrity 
as "a measure of data quality" (see Definitions, page 12). 
13.2 Data as a separate systems component 
This research has identified that the conventional view of data has lead to many 
aspects of data integrity being ignored. Where such systems are used In safety- 
related applications, the safety of the resulting system will often be dependent 
on the correctness of this data. 
R2 This research recommends that data be treated as a separate system 
component. 
This recommendation (112) would help to ensure that data is treated 
appropriately in such systems and would simplify the task of providing detailed 
guidance that is specific to data. 
In data driven-systems data often represents a major part of the system and Its 
generation and maintenance often represent a substantial part of the cost of the 
system. One such strategy would be to develop data integrity requirements that 
allow the targeting of resources by a classification of risk, based upon the role 
played by data errors in the behaviour of the system and their potential affect 
on the overall system integrity failures due to data errors. 
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R3 This research recommends that the data component be considered as 
part of the overall system hazard or risk analysis, leading to an 
apportionment of the system safety requirements to data. In this way 
the data component would be assigned specific integrity requirements. 
Once data has been apportioned integrity requirements, these data integrity 
requirements may then be used to direct the treatment data with appropriate 
rigour. 
13.3 Techniques and measures to be used with the data component 
If recommendations R2 and R3 are accepted than it follows that the treatment of 
the data component should parallel the treatment of the hardware and software 
components of the system. These hardware and software components are 
subject to an extensive array of techniques and measures recommended based 
upon the targeting of resources using a classification of risk. 
R4 This research recommends that further research is required to establish a 
range of techniques and measures to be used with the data component. 
These techniques and measures should be selected based upon the 
degree of risk that data errors might compromise the integrity of the 
overall system. 
R5 This research also recommends that appropriate suites of metrics be 
developed to facilitate the selection of these techniques and measures. 
This research notes that the parallel between the data component and the 
hardware and software components may only be limited to the development 
arena. 
13.4 The definition of data used by safety systems 
This research has presented requirements for the definition of data for use by 
safety systems (see section 4). 
R6 This research recommends the creation of an extended data dictionary 
based upon the requirements discussed in section 4.2. 
The extent and nature of the requirements of data definition is dependant upon 
the system (or systems) under consideration. Where this data and its 
associated data models are extensive, considerable resources may be required 
for the creation and management of data. 
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R7 This research recommends that further research is required into the 
definition of data used by safety systems. The author draws parallels 
between the hardware and software components and the 
recommendations for using differing arrangements or structures of these 
hardware and software components based upon the integrity required. 
For example, high integrity systems commonly employ diversity and 
redundancy as a means of providing additional confidence in the integrity 
of the system. This additional research should examine how data 
diversity and redundancy may be incorporated into the data 
representation. These data representations may also aid both verification 
and validation. 
These data representations may allow some relief of the burden of 
evidence (and the associated evidence management) that otherwise 
accompanies a claim for high integrity data. 
R8 This research recommends that the definition of data recognise the use of 
data by separate systems in the form of separate data architectures for 
each system and that these data architectures are appropriately 
managed. 
The author suggests that an Enterprise Data Architecture may be used as a 
single data definition for the overall system (or enterprise). One means to 
appropriately manage the collection of data architectures would be to use the 
enterprise data management plan to document the processes and procedures 
used to manage the data and the data architectures. In addition a data 
management plan could be used to describe both the Application Data 
Architecture and the definition of the application data interfaces for each 
application. The data descriptions in each data management plan will be derived 
from the data definitions within the Enterprise Data Architecture. 
This author notes that part of the definition of data is the determination of its 
integrity requirements. A method of the determination of data integrity 
requirements is presented in section 5 and is supported by recommendation R3 
above. 
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13.5 The use of the layered model when considering the use of data within a 
systems hierarchy 
This research has presented a layered system model (see section 6). 
R9 This research recommends that any proposed system be considered in 
the context of the layered system model. 
R10 This research also recommends that the use (and re-use) of data be 
considered in the context of the systems that produce and consume data 
within the systems hierarchy. 
R11 This research recommends that the layered systems model be considered 
as subject of future research in the context of the formulation and 
evaluation of safety arguments. 
The layered systems model is generic and provides a means to express 
the relative position of one or more systems within the systems model. 
This model allows whole safety functions to be expressed and when 
linked to rules governing the extent of a safety function provides 
powerful criteria to assess a part or all of a proposed system solution. 
R12 This research recommends that additional research is required to identify 
architectural patterns (and possibly anti-patterns) in existing and 
proposed systems to provide guidance as to suitable general 
arrangements for large-scale safety systems. 
13.6 Lifecycle models for generic and application data 
This research has identified that data design and development may be separate 
from the data provision. Perhaps a necessary first step in any proposed system 
development or system implementation is to identify the requirements of the 
lifecycle models for both generic and application data. These lifecycle models 
will require extensive co-ordination of activities, processes and personnel far 
beyond that which can be shown in a simple'V'lifecycle model. 
R13 This research recommends that a lifecycle model is created as part of the 
design and development of the generic data component; 
R14 This research recognises the separation of data development and data 
provision and recommends that the data integrity requirements be 
communicated from those responsible for the safety argument of the 
system, to those responsible for the provision of the associated data. 
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R15 This research also recommends that a lifecycle model be created as part 
of the application data component. This application data lifecycle model 
will also encompass all the activities of data provision using one or more 
instantiations of the application data lifecycle model. 
The design and implementation of a single data-driven system should take into 
account the data provision as well as the relationship of this individual system 
within the enterprise and the implied systems hierarchy. 
13.7 Roles and responsibilities for those Involved In the design, development 
and provision of data 
This research has discussed the requirement for the extensive co-ordination of 
activities, processes and personnel in the development and Implementation of 
data driven systems. 
R16 This research recommends in any data driven system development or 
implementation of a data driven system that the responsibilities of a Data 
Design Authority be defined. 
The author suggests that the Data Design Authority shall be responsible for the 
identification of any systems and tools required to establish the data 
management process. The Data Design Authority will also be responsible for the 
development a data schedule (or programme) to be used for review of the 
following: 
i) Integration of data resource requirements into the master schedule; 
ii) Establishment of lead time requirements for data provision; 
iii) Identification of risk areas caused by peak periods of effort or event- 
driven data items; and, 
iv) Provision for the assignment of data item originators, by name, who will 
be tasked with preparing individual data items. 
To provide the above information, the Data Design Authority should ensure that 
all data sources are identified, and that the data processing requirements are 
also identified. To assist in the management of each application, a data 
management plan may also be required. 
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13.8 The provision of data for safety systems 
v I. 
This research has described data provision In the form of a generic data supply 
chain (see section 9). Data provision Is strongly Influenced by the integrity of 
the source data and the processes required to transport It to the systems, which 
will consume it. This Is a multi-facetted problem; on one hand are small-scale 
systems whose data can be adequately managed through data entry and 
delivery of a validated dataset. At the other extreme are large-scale systems 
drawing data from a number of sources. This data Is processed, transformed, 
consolidated, transported and finally delivered to one element of the overall 
system. 
R17 This research recommends that the design and development of the 
generic data supply chain be the subject of further research. One aspect 
of this further research should examine patterns and re-use within the 
data supply chain. 
R18 This research recommends that further research Is required to Identify 
architectural constraints, formations and reusable components within the 
Enterprise Data Processing Model. 
13.9 Data ownership, the cost of data,, liability for data errors and risk 
This research has described the use of data provision after the system 
development has been completed. The author notes that data provision, In 
particular, may be subject to a number of financial and political Influences. 
R19 It Is a recommendation from this research that a strategy for the data 
component should recognise that data may be created by a number of 
organisations, groups, or political bodies. 
This strategy may also Include one or more data supply chains and hence should 
recognise changes In ownership, liability and risk as data may also cross the 
boundaries of a number of organisations, groups, or political bodies. 
R20 This research also recommends that additional research Is required to 
establish costs associated with data and data provision. 
If the true cost of a data-driven system Is to be established, the costs 
associated with data must also be taken Into account. When estimating 
software a variety of metrics are used to describe these attributes such 
as lines of code or productivity metrics. Research is required to identify 
metrics describing data. For example, additional research might propose 
metrics associated with data production such as data volume or 
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productivity. This research should also examine how a range of different 
Integrity requirements might influence these metrics. 
13.10 Strategies to be used In the construction of a safety argument for a 
data-driven system 
The system safety case should consider all aspects of the system, its behaviour 
and the processes used In its creation, operation and maintenance. In the 
course of its working life, a data-driven system may be used by one or more 
organisations, which change and evolve over time. Organisational 
responsibilities and boundaries also change. 
R21 This research recommends a data validation policy, based upon DO 200A, 
where the responsibility to ensure that the data integrity requirements 
have been met rests with the user of the data. This policy encourages 
those responsible for the system to identify and define a boundary and to 
use this boundary In the evaluation of the complexity of the safety 
argument. 
It Is common practice to construct a generic safety argument for a system. 
When this system Is Implemented In an application context it is also common to 
create an application safety argument. 
The use of a data driven system may require an additional safety argument to 
address data provision. Where data is updated during the normal operation of 
the system and an additional "process' based safety argument may also be 
required. 
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Appendix A Structure of the Engineering Doctorate Portfolio 
A. 1 Overview of the submissions 
The Engineering Doctorate consists of a portfolio of work, which Is summarised 
by this Executive Summary. The submissions included within the portfolio are: 
i) Introduction to data-driven safety-related systems 
This submission [46] provides an introduction to data-driven safety- 
related systems and sets the context for the research. 
ii) Data integLity_Lequirements 
This submission [47] discusses the safety concepts of hazard, 
opportunity, and accident, together with errors, faults and failures [6]. 
This discussion then develops a classification for data together with a set 
of guidewords for each data classification. 
iii) The use (and re-use) of data within the o[ganisation 
This submission [36] recognises that data-driven and data Intensive 
systems often form part of a systems hierarchy. These systems 
exchange data through their respective interfaces and may also use other 
shared data such as configuration data. 
The submission presents discussion of a systems model In which the 
relative position of each system may be represented. This systems 
model may also be used to describe coupling and cohesion between these 
systems elements. 
This is a general-purpose systems model and may be of use in the 
justification of other forms of safety-related systems. 
iv) The provision of data using a data supply_Chpin 
This submission [32] discusses the issues associated with the use of a 
data supply chain. The description of the data supply chain Is based 
upon DO 200A [18]. The DO 200A data supply chain description Is 
extended into a generalised form to facilitate its wider application. The 
submission also presents a design method for data supply chains, 
together with a diagrammatic notation. 
This submission identifies the issues associated with ownership and 
responsibility, particularity the ownership of data errors and the Implicit 
liability often associated with these errors, faults and failure. 
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V) Data inteaLity* published papgrs 
This submission [40] contains fourteen published papers [41 to 44,48 to 
57] together with a brief review of each paper identifying the salient 
points and the contribution of the authors. 
The paper "Data Management in Data-Driven Safety-Related Systems" 
[41] won the "Best PaDer" award of the 20th International Safety System 
Conference 2002, Denver. Colorado USA. 
vi) Literature review 
This submission [5] contains the literature review. 
vii) The nature of data used by safety-related sY51ems 
This submission [4] combines a number of elements from existing 
submissions to provide a focused discussion on the "nature'of data. The 
purpose of this submission is to provide a summary of the descriptions of 
the 'nature' of data that have been proposed, albeit informally, during the 
course of this research. 
viii) Industrial practice 
This submission [20] records industrial practice relating to data-driven 
systems through twelve structured interviews and examination of 
supporting documents. 
ix) Data integri : Journal paper 
This submission [58] contains a journal paper [59], together with a brief 
review. 
X) The provision of data using a liferycle model 
This submission [33] recognises that once data is treated as a separate 
systems component, the apportionment of the system safety 
requirements demand that data is treated with the same rigour as the 
hardware and software components of the system component, Including 
the use of an appropriate lifecycle model. The data lifecycle model Is 
complicated by data production (or data extraction), as these activities 
are typically external to the development environment. The data lifecycle 
must also take account of data provision to ensure that data of the 
required integrity is available when the system enters service. While the 
system is in service data production and data provision may also be 
required to provide in-service data updates. 
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A. 2 A suggested order of reading the submissions 
The following is a suggested order of reading: 
0 The nature of data used by safety-related systems. 
ii) Literature review. 
iii) Industrial practice. 
iv) Data integrity requirements. 
V) The use (and re-use) of data within the organisation. 
vi) The provision of data using a lifecycle model. 
vii) The provision of data using a data supply chain. 
viii) Data integrity: Published papers. 
ix) Data integrity: Journal paper. 
The submission "Introduction to data-driven safety-related systemsw has been 
superseded by "the nature of data used by safety-related systems". 
'7; '* 
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Appendix BA layered model for a hierarchy of systems 
0.1 Introduction 
It is common for large distributed systems to be composed of many Interrelated 
subsystems. One of the challenges in managing large-scale systems is 
demonstrating that any change made to the system or subsystem is 
independent and does not also induce undesired changes. In such interrelated 
(and interdependent) systems even small changes may require extensive 
justification. 
This research has developed a layered model to explore and express the 
relationships within these large distributed systems. As already discussed in 
section 6, the form of these distributed systems varies tremendously; one can 
gain an insight into the interaction between system elements by considering a 
typical distributed control system. For this purpose, section 6 Introduced the 
very specific example of a large-scale railway control system, though it should 
be noted that not all systems would follow this scheme. 
The application of this layered model should not be restricted to the discussion 
of data and data integrity. Subsystems may only exchange limited data 
volumes. This layered model may also be used to express the influence of 
functional and non functional behaviour in the context of the overall system. 
13.2 Describing the layered model 
B. 2- 1 The use (and re-use) of data within an organisation 
It is common for a hierarchy of control systems to use shared definitions of the 
physical environment as configuration data. Each of these systems requires 
data to satisfy the desired functional behaviour using a range of data at differing 
levels of abstraction and detail. Where low-level protection devices are used, 
these devices are generally subordinate to the control system. These protection 
devices combine low-level data describing a small number of physical devices to 
create a high integrity protection system. Several low-level protection devices 
may be used within one control area under the supervision of the control system 
and its operator. 
However such distributed systems need not be data-intensive. The layered 
model may also be used to express the influence of the subsystem In terms of 
the functionality it provides. 
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B. 2.2 A generalised description of the layered model 
The generalised description of the layered model is based upon consideration of 
a distributed system. In particular the layered model seeks to establish the role 
of each layer and the relationship between layers. The following is very specific 
example of a large-scale railway control system. It should be noted that not all 
systems would follow this scheme. This model is developed from an incomplete 
and unpublished RAILTRACK internal memorandum by Richard Allan [29]. In 
addition, elements of the layered model are also drawn from concepts contained 
within the 'Basic Reference Model for Open Systems Inter-connection' (ISO OSI) 
model [60]. This latter model partitions communications services between 7 
layers with defined interfaces and peer protocols that permit the separation of 
application development from the underlying communication system. 
Two important elements of the OSI model are that each layer [291: 
i) Communicates with its peer layer in a different communication unit; and 
ii) Provides a service to the layer above and expects a particular kind of 
service from the layer below. 
Enterprise 
Business Unit 
Optimising 
Supervisory 
Reflex 
Plant Interface 
Plant 
Figure 20: A layered model for a hierarchy of systems 
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The model, in Figure 20, describes an abstraction into layers and allows the 
development, replacement of the underlying layers based upon respect for the 
services provide by the layer and preservation of the interfaces. These layers 
a re: 
The'p/ant'layer represents single instances of elements of the plant 
infrastructure, the physical equipment; 
The 'plant interface'layer represents the interface to plant infrastructure 
elements. In essence this layer converts physical phenomenon from 
sensors (including feedback from actuators) into abstract representations 
such as electrical signals or data. This layer also provides the control 
interfaces to actuators; 
The'retlex' layer is the lowest layer at which the measured status is 
interpreted and control (or protection) actions are carried out. These 
actions may be based upon information (which may include stored 
information), any demands upon the system and some set of rules. In 
this reflex layer the rules and information completely determine the 
control action. These reflex actions are in essence rule based. In 
principle all activities in the reflex layer can be automated. Where a 
protection system does not require the intervention of an operator these 
protection systems are described as reflex actions. Safety-critical 
functions commonly require a fast response and therefore often make 
use of reflex actions; 
iv) The 'supervisory' layer represents a more complex level of control. This 
complexity may be a result of large-scale operation, integrating a number 
of dissimilar functions, or interpreting complex (or ambiguous) data (or 
some combination of these). The distinction between the reflex and 
supervisory layers is the judgement or knowledge that must be applied, 
particularly in degraded or emergency situations. Supervisory systems 
are characterised by the need to support the judgement of the operator 
doing the supervision. Predominantly the supervisory layer is downward 
looking viewing the performance of the lower levels; 
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V) The 'optimisation' layer represents the most sophisticated control layer. 
At its most developed the optimisation layer should maximise the use of 
resources from the delivery of the service. The optimisation layer should 
respect the performance and safety constraints of the underlying 
(transportation) system. The information demands on the optimisation 
layer are high, requiring a full understanding of the underlying system, 
the planned service and contingency plans. The full understanding of the 
underlying system includes the performance capabilities and constraints 
of intervening layers of the system; 
vi) The 'business unit'layer represents the divisional responsibility of the 
delivery of the planned service. This layer normally plays little part in the 
real-time operation of the operational parts of the system being more 
concerned with the medium term maintenance (including competencies) 
and development of the infrastructure, and the subsequent future 
delivery of the planned service. The business unit will become involved 
in the short-term operation of the system in response to a serious 
incident that cause substantial impact on the delivery of the service. 
vii) The 'enterpHse' layer represents the corporate entity; responsible for the 
planning and execution of large-scale changes to the infrastructure; 
responding to changes in legislation; setting and maintaining standards, 
procedures and competency requirements. 
The point is well made by Richard Allan [29], that implementation of large-scale 
control systems requires a framework in which to express the role played by 
respective system components and provide a mechanism by which a large-scale 
system safety may be argued. . The author concurs with Richard Allan [29) in 
considering that the supervisory layer should be the highest layer at which a 
safety function should be implemented. This boundary depicted in Figure 20 by 
the box surrounding the plant, plant interface, reflex and supervisory layers. 
The optimisation layer should take into account knowledge of current and 
possible future operational conditions. These operational conditions may be 
restrictions on the use of the transportation infrastructure due to planned or 
unplanned maintenance. Optimisation is therefore required to respect the 
performance and safety constraints of the system. Clearly, optimisation should 
only employ safe functions; that is, the optimisation of the execution of the 
planned service should not be capable of compromising the safety of the system. 
Hence the upper limit of the safety function should be the supervisory layer. 
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B. 3.1 Introduction 
Coupling and cohesion are ways of describing the functional decomposition or 
partitioning of the design. Coupling is concerned with the interrelationships 
between elements of the design (modules), whilst cohesion is concerned with 
how well the elements within a module are related to one another. 
B. 3.2 Coupling 
Structured methodologies are by definition concerned with the structure of the 
solution by addressing the partition of the solution into modules. The division of 
the problem into 'manageable' components is used to deal with complexity. 
The classification of coupling has been proposed in a number of design 
methodologies and this submission uses the example of a structured 
methodology. Although primarily concerned with the structure of software, 
structured methodologies combine a number of techniques and measures to 
describe the solution. Structured methodologies represent the hard systems 
view and hence are focused upon the engineered solution. This is in contrast to 
the soft systems methodologies, which attempt to take a more human centred 
approach, particularly but not exclusively to requirements elicitation [61 to 63]. 
In a systems context coupling need not be restricted to a single design. The 
system will interact with its environment and quite possibly other instantiations 
of the same or similar systems as peers or with subordinate and supervisory 
systems. Therefore the concept of coupling should be extended to consider 
vertical coupling between the system and subordinate and supervisory systems, 
and horizontal coupling between other instantiation of the same or similar 
systems as peers. 
In the context of this research, coupling is primarily based upon the exchange of 
data either through a shared (static) description of the infrastructure or dynamic 
data passed across the system boundary [36]. 
B. 3.2.1 Vertical coupling 
Vertical coupling refers to coupling between different adjacent vertical layers of 
the layered model. An example of vertical coupling is instantaneous status data 
passed from the reflex layer to the supervisory layer. 
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Data volumes are characterised by the control strategy that also may include 
some stored data. The degree of coupling whether tightly or loosely coupled will 
influence the resources required to either maintain or upgrade elements within 
the control system. 
B. 3.2.2 Horizontal coupling 
Horizontal coupling refers to coupling between the same adjacent layers of the 
layered model. An example of horizontal coupling is instantaneous status data 
passed from one instance of the reflex layer to one or more instances of the 
reflex layer within a control strategy. 
From the description above data is passed horizontally between layers. Layers 
within the layered model are therefore horizontally coupled. The degree of 
coupling whether tightly or loosely coupled will influence the resources required 
to either maintain or upgrade elements within the control system. 
B. 3.3 A single control system 
A practical control system will use both vertical and horizontal coupling, 
especially where the control strategy employs a number of similar components. 
These control elements may possess subtle or gross behavioural differences as 
in many cases they may be supplied by a range of different manufactures. 
Figure 21 depicts the physical components of an operator workstation, excluding 
the human operator (and by inference the optimisation an operator may use in 
the course of their normal duties). The control of two protection systems is 
combined within this workstation. In this example, each protection system 
consists of two plant interface units. 
Reflex Reflex 
Plant Plant Plant Plant 
Interface Interface Interface Interface 
Plant Plant 
Figure 21: Coupling within an operator workstation 
Although this is a simplistic representation, both the vertical and horizontal 
coupling of each component may be identified. Tightly coupled components are 
difficult to modify without modification of adjacent components. On the other 
hand loosely coupled component are more readily modified or upgraded (even 
replaced) without necessitating modification of adjacent components. 
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Modification or upgrade (even replacement) should also consider the properties 
of the data component, as well as the fit-form-function properties normally 
considered for the mechanical, electrical or software components of the system. 
B. 3.4 Independence 
In this research data independence is taken to be the ability to maintain or 
upgrade (even replace) data components, where these data components 
possess the good design properties of low coupling and high cohesion. 
Earlier discussions within this section have described coupling as a measure of 
the modularity and association of the system elements. The primary purpose of 
this modularisation is the management of complexity through the division of the 
problem at hand into successively more manageable components. This division 
should be considered not only at the system, sub-system, application and 
process, but also particularly for open systems, which interact with their 
environment and the data, used within the systems of systems context. A 
system possessing low coupling and high cohesion will generally possess the 
desirable design properties of resilience and stability but, in addition, low 
coupling and high cohesion will also minimise the effects that changes to one 
component have on other components of the system. A good data design will 
also possess these desirable properties of low coupling and high cohesion, and 
will therefore also possess the design properties of resilience and stability. 
B. 4 System boundary issues 
B. 4.1 Data exchanged across the systems boundary 
The definition of the system boundary is an essential step in the definition of the 
system. The boundary provides demarcation between those components, which 
are within the system, and those, which are external. Communication across 
the system boundary requires the identification and definition of an interface 
description including the data passed across the interface. 
External information systems may provide a range of data including status data 
as well as the schedule. Data presented at this system boundary may not be 
error free. Within a systems context these interfaces may contain implicit 
transformations between the external and internal use of data. In some cases 
the internal and external meanings of this data may also be different. 
Section 7.3, Figure 7 illustrates a generic system boundary and its associated 
issues. 
Data presented at the system boundary by an external system will be 
transformed or adapted from the external representation to the internal 
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representation of the control system. This transformation or adaptation may 
occur in some automated function or may require manual intervention. This 
data will also require verification. Analysis of the control system design is 
required to establish the consequence of faults in this data as this data passes 
across the boundary of the control system. Further analysis should also 
establish the sensitivity to changes in this data. Such analysis will facilitate the 
definition of 'properties' or rules by which faults in the data may be detected at 
the boundary of the system. 
B. 4.2 Data verification at the system boundary 
Data presented at the system boundary may contain errors. Error discovery is 
most effective when it is achieved at the system boundary. The management of 
data, which contains errors, will require some form of quarantine to separate out 
erroneous data. 
The ultimate responsibility for ensuring that data meets its data integrity 
requirements for its intended use rests with the end-user of the data. This 
position is supported by DO 200A [18]. The end-user provides design criteria 
and hence may influence the mitigation of hazards through data error detection 
at the system boundary. 
Whilst gross errors may be easily recognised as these will often breach some 
known pre-condition. Plausible errors are more difficult to detect, requiring 
additional pre-conditions and possibly additional redundant or duplicate data to 
facilitate error detection. 
Data presented at the interface should be of an integrity required by the using 
system. Hence the system supplying the data should be of similar or higher 
integrity than the using system. The rules for passing data between systems of 
differing integrity are discussed in sections 6.5. 
B. 4.3 Automation and manual intervention 
Error detection will generally be undertaken on both sides of the system 
boundary by each system. Any detected data errors will be reported to the 
DRACAS and where a transmission error is detected the data re-transmitted. 
Many external information systems may not facilitate the automated processing 
of these detected data errors, and therefore some form of manual intervention 
may be required. 
It may be desirable that error detection may be undertaken by a software 
application. In many cases it is desirable that error detection is automated 
rather than automatic. Many existing system may present data at the system 
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boundary that does not conform to the required definition or data quality 
requirements. In such cases manual intervention may be required where 
addition interpretation and context is required from the human operator. 
However error detection may not always be undertaken on a single message, or 
data item. The use of a schedule provides an insight into this problem. A 
schedule is unlikely to be downloaded as a single transmission. Indeed this 
schedule may have a number of updates, over an extended period of time, 
taking account of persistent operation conditions or simply to modify (add or 
remove) a planned service. Updates may be delivered as single service 
descriptions. The update mechanism may require that each update be applied in 
sequence. Each data update may also add an additional service or modify an 
existing service or even delete the service entirely. In addition update 
messages may be used to add, delete, and modify the static data, which 
describes the service to be provided. Therefore error detection may take a 
number of forms, including manual intervention. 
Manual intervention is not only required where the automated error detection 
detects badly formed messages but also where messages are missing (based 
upon update message sequence number) or where the described service uses 
attributes of the service to describe implausible or improbable services. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the submission of flight plans within European 
airspace requires a significant manual intervention (of greater than 30% of all 
flight plans) before these flight plans may be submitted to the flight planning 
system. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that errors in flight plans, which 
enter the flight planning system, have the potential to cause significant system 
failures. 
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Appendix C The design and construction of a data supply chain 
C. 1 The design and construction of a data supply chain 
C. 1.1 The portfolio submission: "The provision of data using data supply chain" 
This appendix is based upon the EngD submission "The provision of data using 
data supply chain" [32] and draws heavily from it. The concept of the data 
supply chain is based upon the aeronautical data chain set out in DO 200A [18]. 
The author contributes two additional phases to this description. A further 
contribution is the description of a method for the design of a data supply chain, 
including a graphical representation. When considering the design of a data 
supply chain it may become evident that combinations of phases are used 
several times. These phases may be collected together in formations to provide 
combinational re-use. 
Well-defined data supply chains are not in common use. One exception is the 
provision of aeronautical navigation data for use in Air Traffic Management 
(ATM). The design and definition of the data supply chain should consider the 
capability of the organisations to supply, meet, and maintain the data integrity 
requirements. Where these criteria cannot be met alternative systems designs 
should be considered which apportion lower integrity requirements to the data 
component or a design, which employs alternatives to data-driven (or data 
intensive) systems. 
The assertion that supplied data is of the required integrity can only be 
substantiated if the data is accompanied by evidence supporting this claim. 
When data passes along a data supply chain that crosses organisational or 
political boundaries additional considerations include the ownership of the data, 
and liability for any data errors. 
Data provision demands a systematic, ordered design based upon the 
requirements of the system and the ability of the organisation to support data 
provision. It is possible to design robust data supply chains, but if the 
organisation does not or cannot support the provision of data of suitable 
integrity, the integrity of the operational system will be compromised. In 
extreme cases this may lead to system failures, harm or significant loss. 
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Good system design supports and enhances the capabilities of the organisation 
and may also reflect aspects of culture and education. Therefore the process for 
data provision should be designed to support the capability of the organisation 
to supply, meet, and maintain the data integrity requirements. Where these 
criteria cannot be met alternatives to data-driven (or data-intensive) systems 
should be employed. 
C. 1.2 A graphical representation of a data supply chain 
The following graphical representation provides a means of presenting the data 
supply chain as a directed graph. For ease of representation standard flowchart 
symbols are re-used, as these are commonly available in a number of 
commercial diagramming packages. These reused flowchart symbols are shown 
in Table 2. 
The key elements of the representation are the datasets, the phases, which act 
upon them and the criteria and evidence that support them. Corrective actions 
are represented within the error reporting blocks and should be taken to 
represent part of a DRACAS process. 
To simplify the description of the data supply chain the following symbols are 
used to represent each phase. 
Table 2: Data supply chain symbols 
This symbol Is used to represent the data supply chain 
phase. These phases will be one of assemble, receive, 
translate, distribute, select, transforrn and consolidate 
phases. 
This symbol is used to represent a data store or a 
Dataset dataset 
This symbol is used to represent the available 
evidence. This evidence may take the form of physical 
evidence or a reference to the physical evidence. 
This symbol is used to represent the error reporU as 
Error reports part of the DRACAS 
This symbol Is used to represent the verification or 
Verification 
Criteria validation criteria 
i 
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This symbol is used to represent the distribution media, 
Disbibution 
Media either physical media such as magnetic media (disk or 
tape), or logical media used for electronic transmission. 
M 
This symbol is used to represent an organisational or 
0 C political boundary across which data is passed. :3 
CL 
0) 
12 
C. 2 The design of a data supply chain 
C. 2.1 A design method for a data supply chain 
This design method consists of seven steps to provide systematic, ordered 
design based upon the data integrity requirements of the system. In using this 
method the designer must bear in mind the ability of the organisation to support 
data provision. 
Any component, phase or data chain, which attracts high integrity requirements, 
should be reviewed and where possible alternative arrangements of the data 
chain should be considered. This may also require a review of the system 
design and the apportionment of the system integrity requirements amongst the 
system components (hardware, software, data, operational process and 
procedure). In extreme cases the system design may be rejected in favour of 
one, which contains a re-distribution of the system integrity requirements. If 
the high integrity requirement remains after this review, additional confidence 
may be required from diverse tools, processes and where possible diverse data 
sources. 
Figure 22 to Figure 27 are used to describe each step the data chain design 
method, using an example of a data origin, two organisations and a consuming 
system. The reader's attention is drawn to the use of the cloud shape to 
highlight the area of the design being considered in that methodological step. 
These diagrams are presented in a small scale to illustrate the design method. 
The intention is to draw the reader's attention to the different layers within the 
data supply chain. A more detailed description is presented in the submission 
the provision of data using data supply chain [32]. 
The open box shapes represent the organisations within the data supply chain 
and the vertical sides of these boxes are intended to indicate the limits of each 
organisation. In some cases this will also represent the limitations of 
responsibility and liability. 
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The basic design method is described below: 
Identify the data origins 
This will be the start of the data supply chain. As a general rule the first 
phase will be a receive phase. Where data has a known integrity this 
data may be stored for use by subsequent phases. If additional 
confidence in the integrity of the data is required then this additional 
confidence may be attained through test, analysis and where necessary 
simulation. 
lo-I 
Figure 22: Step 1- Identify the data origins 
Identify the (organisational, legal, and political) boundaries within the 
supply chain 
Changes of responsibility will require that the data supply chain 
recognises the boundary and creates a suitable distribution media. As a 
general rule the select, format and distribute phases are used to create 
this media. The exchange need not be a physical media but may be an 
automated exchange. The important requirement is to recognise the 
change of responsibility, and possibly ownership. On the other side of 
I 
Figure 23: Step 2- Identify the boundaries 
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Identify the process and adaptation phases required 
The major interface issues are established. The next step is to plan the 
required processing and adaptation of the datasets. This may be 
achieved with the assemble, translate, select and transform phases. 
a 
Figure 24: Step 3- Identify the adaptations and processing of the 
datasets 
Identify the process and adaptation phases required 
The integrity requirements for the data are specified. These integrity 
requirements are then apportioned between the data source and the 
phases of the data supply chain. 
F 
Figure 25: Step 4- Apportion the integrity requirements 
Identify evidence requirements 
Having apportioned the integrity requirements between the data source 
and the phases of the data supply chain, it is then possible to establish 
the evidence requirements for the data source and the phases of the data 
supply chain to satisfy the assurance model. This will identify the 
verification criteria required by each phase. 
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Figure 26: Step 5- Identify evidence requirements 
vi) Specify corrective action process 
Failure to satisfy verification criteria of each phase will create error 
reports, which require corrective action. The final step is to identify the 
corrective action process for each phase; group of phases and the data 
supply chain as a whole. 
FT 
mlýw ýý 4"Uwd IM-1101 ý 
Figure 27: Step 6- Specify the corrective action process 
vii) Assess the design of the data supply chain; 
Eý 
Olt] 
Repeat steps 1 to 7 as necessary to attain required goals (integrity 
organisational responsibilities, liabilities, ownerships). These goals 
include: 
a) the required integrity, 
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b) 'fit' with the organisation boundaries. The creation of a design for a 
data supply chain may reveal opportunities to reorganise the 
enterprise. A reorganisation should recognise the influence of the 
organisation on the design of the data supply chain. Changes of 
ownership and responsibilities may produce simple or conversely 
complex supply chains. Any change of ownership may also change 
the liabilities for data errors. 
Note: The data supply chain must be practical; it must be capable of delivering 
appropriate data under normal operating conditions. Consideration 
should also be given to the failure modes of the data supply chain, its 
phases and their components. 
The use of low integrity tools, such as databases, should only be considered 
where adequate error detection schemes are employed. When low integrity 
tools are used, these should be assessed to demonstrate that failure of these 
tools would not introduce data errors. However as these are low integrity tools, 
consideration ought to be given to how much assessment evidence is required to 
show that failure of the low integrity component does not interfere with the 
integrity of the data. In extreme cases it may be more cost effective to use high 
integrity tools, because of the frequency of update of these low integrity COTS 
products. For example, each new release of a commercial database product 
may require a new assessment, as the database product may contain new and 
undocumented 'features'. 
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